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United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error Coram
Nobis and the Morgan Footnote Paradox
In the federal courts, coram nobis is a post-conviction rem-
edy available in the district court to challenge a criminal con-
viction;' in certain situations, it is the only relief available2 to
avoid the collateral consequences of a federal conviction.3
United States v. Cooper,4 a recent case before the Fifth Circuit,
involved an appeal from a district court order denying what the
circuit court construed as petitions for writs of error coram
nobis.5 The Cooper court's opinion represents the latest and
most developed argument in a twenty-year old dispute among
the circuits over the fundamental nature of the writ of error
1. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1954); United States v.
Loshiavo, 531 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1976); Grene v. United States, 448 F.2d 720,
720-21 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Owensby v. United States, 353 F.2d 412, 416
(10th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 962 (1966); see also infra notes 38-45 and
accompanying text (discussing the modern status of coram nobis in the federal
courts).
2. Coram nobis is the only post-conviction remedy available when the pe-
titioner no longer is in custody. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 596, at 470-71 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1989); see also infra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text (discussing custody and the availability of different post-
conviction remedies).
3. See Note, The Need for Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts, 59 YALE
L.J. 786, 786-87 & nn.1-5 (1950). The collateral consequences of a federal con-
viction include ineligibility for naturalization, military service, and certain civil
rights such as voting or holding office; expulsion from or denial of access to
such professions as law and medicine; and sentence enhancement for recidi-
vism in both the federal and state courts. Id at 786-87. An additional conse-
quence is the social stigma of a felony conviction. An excellent example that
has produced several petitions for coram nobis is the convictions of Japanese
Americans for violating curfew and internment orders during World War H.
See generally Iyeki, The Japanese Amercan Coram Nobis Cases: Exposing the
Myth of Disloyalty, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 199, 209-14 (1984) (dis-
cussing Japanese Americans' use of coram nobis to challenge convictions for
violating World War H military internment orders as unconstitutional, to re-
move the stigma of disloyalty associated with such convictions).
4. 876 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
5. Cooper sought to overturn two federal felony convictions after serving
his sentences. Id. at 1193. In 1967, Cooper pled guilty to conspiracy to steal
government property and theft of government property in the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas. Again in 1967, before a different judge of the same court, he
pled guilty to interstate transportation of a firearm from which the serial
number had been removed. Cooper served sentences of five and two years re-
spectively for these convictions. Id. He later filed two actions in the sentenc-
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coram nobis: whether a coram nobis motion is essentially a
civil or criminal proceeding.6
The fundamental nature of coram nobis is significant be-
cause it determines which rules of procedure generally apply to
coram nobis motions at the district and appellate levels.7
Although designating a coram nobis motion as essentially civil
or criminal does not require blanket application of the civil or
criminal rules to all aspects of the proceeding (the question is
not whether comm nobis is purely civil or criminal),8 the
designation does serve as a basic guide for determining which
rules are proper in specific circumstances. 9
The particular issue in Cooper was whether the criminal or
civil time limit for filing a notice of appeal applies to coram
ing court challenging his convictions. The Southern District of Texas denied
relief. I& Cooper then appealed to the Fifth Circuit. IL
The Fifth Circuit construed Cooper's original actions in the district court
as petitions for writs of error coram nobis. I& According to the Fifth Circuit,
the district court and Cooper had assumed mistakenly that the actions were
motions to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See infra notes 53-60 and
accompanying text (discussing § 2255 motions). Yet § 2255 was unavailable to
Cooper, because a person must be in custody to bring such a motion, and
Cooper already had served his sentences. Comm nobis, however, has no cus-
tody requirement. Id (citing United States v. Hay, 702 F.2d 572, 573-74 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
6. Cooper, 876 F.2d at 1193-94.
7. L. YACKLE, PosT-CoNvICTIoN REMEDIES § 36, at 164 (1981 & Supp.
1989); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 592, at 433 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1989); 18 AM.
JUR. 2D Comm Nobis § 27, at 651-52 (1985).
8. Classification of a post-conviction remedy as purely civil or criminal is
inexact and, therefore, inappropriate. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTIcE 22-
1.2 commentary at 22.10 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS]. The ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice provide that rules governing post-conviction
remedies should reflect the particular attributes of the remedy and not the la-
bel "civil" or "criminal." I& The Supreme Court has held, for example, that
the description of habeas corpus as purely civil is inexact. Habeas corpus is a
unique proceeding. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969). Nonetheless,
classifying a post-conviction remedy as generally criminal in nature may be
reasonable to the degree the remedy is an extencion of the original criminal
proceeding. STANDARDS, supra, Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10. This
general classification provides the court a reference point for analyzing the at-
tributes of a post-conviction remedy. See id. at 22.10-.11. For example, the
courts consider a motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence or a mo-
tion to withdraw a guilty plea as generally criminal proceedings. IL at 22.10.
9. The essential quality of the proceeding, not the label, determines what
rules apply. STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10-
.11. For example, certain constitutional guarantees associated with criminal
prosecutions, such as right to counsel, would not apply necessarily to comm
nobis proceedings even if they were generally criminal in nature. Id. A post-
conviction remedy criminal in nature is distinguishable from a criminal prose-
cution. See idi
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nobis appeals.' 0 If a coram nobis motion is a civil proceeding,
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) governing civil
cases applies, and the time limit would be 60 days."1 In con-
trast, if a coram nobis motion is a criminal proceeding, Rule
4(b) governing criminal cases applies, and the time limit would
be 10 days.' 2 The Cooper court concluded that the civil time
limit applies to coram nobis appeals because a coram nobis mo-
tion is a civil proceeding comparable to a motion to vacate sen-
tence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the rules governing civil
appeals apply to section 2255 appeals.13
This Comment analyzes the Cooper court's conclusion that
a coram nobis motion is a civil proceeding and that the rules
governing section 2255 motions should serve as a model for
coram nobis motions. Part I examines the history and prior in-
terpretations of coram nobis and section 2255. Part II discusses
the Cooper decision and its reasoning. Part III criticizes the
Cooper court's conclusion and argues in favor of the opposite
one. The Comment concludes that the Fifth Circuit's compari-
son of a coram nobis motion to a section 2255 motion is flawed
because a coram nobis motion is essentially criminal, not civil.
Although the mixture of criminal and civil rules governing sec-
tion 2255 motions at the district court level' 4 may serve as a
model for coram nobis proceedings,' 5 the civil rules governing
section 2255 motions at the appellate court level' 6 are not prop-
erly applicable to coram nobis appeals.
10. Cooper, 876 F.2d at 1193-94.
11. Id. at 1193 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)).
12. Id. at 1193-94 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)).
13. Id. at 1194 (citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952)
(stating that the civil rules apply to § 2255 appeals); RULES GOVERNING § 2255
PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 11 (applying the civil time limit for a no-
tice of appeal to § 2255 appeals)).
14. A special mixture of civil and criminal rules governs § 2255 proceed-
ings at the district court level. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE
U.S. DIST. CTS. 1 advisory committee's note; see i.fra notes 95-99 and accompa-
nying text.
15. Designating a coram nobis motion as essentially criminal does not re-
quire blanket application of the criminal rules. See supra notes 8-9 and accom-
panying text.
16. The civil rules govern all aspects of § 2255 proceedings in the appellate
courts. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 209 n.4; see infra notes 89-99 and accompanying
text.
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I. HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF CORAM NOBIS
AND SECTION 2255
A. COR4M NoBIs IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
1. Common Law Origins of Coram Nobis
The writ of error coram nobis' 7 emerged in sixteenth cen-
tury England. The writ was one of two common law writs
available to correct errors of fact not appearing on the record
that would have precluded the court's judgment had the court
known of the error when it rendered judgment.' 8 Coram nobis,
along with the writ of error coram vobis,19 was available to at-
tack both civil and criminal judgments. Each writ directed a
particular law court to examine its own judgment.20 Coram
nobis, meaning "before us," lay in the King's Bench; coram
vobis, meaning "before you," lay in the Court of Common
Pleas.21 This common law distinction lost its significance in the
17. The full name of the common law writ is error quae coram nobis resi-
dent. 2 W. TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH, AND COM-
MON PLEAS, IN PERSONAL AcTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 1136 (n.p. 4th Am. ed.
1856), cited in Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 365,
370 (1929). This Comment will examine only briefly the origins of coram
nobis in English common law and its modern form in the federal courts. For a
detailed discussion of coram nobis, see L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 9, at 36-39;
see also Freedman, supra, at 366-71 (discussing distinction among writ of error
coram nobis, writ of error coram vobis, and general writs of error in both Eng-
lish and American law); Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil
Practice, 20 VA. L. REV. 423, 423-37 (1934); Thornton, Comm Nobis Et Coram
Vobis, 5 IND. L.J. 603, 604-07 (1930); Comment, Coram Nobis: Availability in
Federal Courts, 18 ALB. L. REV. 237, 243-51 (1954); Note, supra note 3, at 787-88
(outlining basic features of cormm nobis).
18. Thornton, supra note 17, at 606. The writ was not available to chal-
lenge judgments erroneously based on facts proven or admitted at trial. I& at
607. Omission of facts on the record must not be the result of the petitioner's
negligence. Id.
19. The full name of the common law writ is error quae coram vobis resi-
dent. 2 W. TIDD, supra note 17, at 1137, cited in Freedman, supra note 17, at
370.
20. The writs of error coram nobis and error coram vobis differed from
ordinary common law writs of error. An ordinary writ of error removed a
judgment from an inferior court to a superior one for review and correction of
errors of law or fact. Thornton, supra note 17, at 605. Coram nobis and coram
vobis, in contrast, directed the court that rendered the judgment to correct its
own error. Id. Furthermore, unlike an ordinary writ of error, comm nobis
and coram vobis have neither a certiorari clause nor a return day. Id
21. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 9, at 37. Although commentators agree on
this distinction, they disagree on the basis for the distinction. I& Commenta-
tors provide different explanations for the names of the writs depending on
whether they believe the King's Bench, a law court, or the Court of Chancery,
an equity court, issued the writs. See i Compare Thornton, supra note 17, at
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United States22 and "coram nobis" has emerged as the predomi-
nant term.23
2. Recognition of Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts
Before 1954, the availability of coram nobis to challenge
criminal convictions in federal district courts was unsettled-24
The Supreme Court had declined to rule on the question5 and
the circuit courts were divided.26 In 1948, an amendment to
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
abolished coram nobis,-' conceivably in both criminal and civil
605 (asserting that the King's Bench issued the writ) with Freedman, supra
note 17, at 368-69 (contending that the Court of Chancery issued the writ).
22. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 9, at 38-39. The English common law dis-
tinction between coram nobis and coram vobis reflects the procedural nature
of the English judicial system as opposed to the substantive nature of the
writs. See id. Most American courts have shown little concern for this techni-
cal distinction and have used the terms interchangeably. I&r (citing Orfield,
supra note 17, at 425); accord Freedman, supra note 17, at 370.
23. Freedman, supra note 17, at 370.
24. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 37, at 168-69.
25. Id. The Supreme Court first discussed the availability of coram nobis
in the federal courts in 1914, reserving judgment on the issue. United States v.
Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914). Although the Court approved of the writ by im-
plication in 1942, Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942), the Court later
stated in 1949 that "it is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal
case today where that remedy would be necessary or appropriate," United
States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 476 n.4 (1947).
26. Compare Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1947)
(holding coram nobis available to challenge judgment on grounds of insanity
at time of plea); Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150, 151 (4th Cir. 1946)
(holding coram nobis available to challenge judgment on grounds of mental in-
competence to waive counsel or plead); Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106,
106-07 (5th Cir. 1946) (holding coram nobis available to challenge judgment on
grounds that material witness perjured testimony); and United States v.
Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1944) (treating motion to declare conviction
"null and void" as an application for coram nobis when injustice otherwise
would occur) with United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir.
1953) (holding Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had abolished
coram nobis as a means to challenge both civil and criminal judgments).
Although these decisions indicate that a majority of the circuit courts ad-
dressing the issue concluded that coram nobis was available to challenge crim-
inal judgments, the timing of the decisions is important. Kerschman appears
to be the only circuit decision to examine whether the 1948 amendment to
Rule 60(b), see infra note 27 and accompanying text, abolished coram nobis as
a remedy to criminal judgments. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Kerschman
is particularly significant because the court effectively reversed an earlier deci-
sion holding that coram nobis was available. Tinkoff v. United States, 129 F.2d
21, 22 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding coram nobis available to challenge judgment on
grounds that witness connived with prosecutors to perjure testimony).
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b). Amended Rule 60(b) reads in pertinent part:
"Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and
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cases.28 Furthermore, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 35
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, allowing a
district court to correct an illegal sentence at any time,29 and
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 1948,30 providing for a mo-
tion to attack sentence "in the nature of the ancient writ of er-
ror coram nobis."31
In 1954, the Supreme Court finally resolved the dispute
over the availability of coram nobis in United States v. Mor-
gan.32 The Morgan Court held that the writ of error coram
bills in the nature of a bill review, are abolished, and the procedure for ob-
taining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action." I& Rule 60(b) has a criminal counterpart
promulgated in 1944, Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 36 advisory committee note. Rule 36 authorizes courts to cor-
rect clerical mistakes and errors "arising from oversight or omission," tradi-
tional coram nobis functions, but does not expressly abolish coram nobis. FED.
Pa CmM. P. 36.
28. Kerschman, 201 F.2d at 684; see supra note 26.
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35. Rule 35 fulfills a similar procedural role as corn
nobis. The federal courts followed the common law rule that a trial court
could correct a judgment only within the same term. This rule prevented trial
courts from disrupting appeals by altering judgments while the appeals were
pending. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 37, at 167. The rule was potentially un-
just when an error did not appear on the record. The trial court could not cor-
rect the error after the end of the term and the appellate court could not
correct the error, because it did not appear on the record. Id- Coram nobis
also provides relief in such situations. I& at 167-68.
Rule 35 gave district courts power to correct illegal sentences (sentences
not authorized by a proper judgment of conviction) after the court's term had
expired. Id. at 168. Yet Rule 35 did not allow correction of sentences illegally
imposed (sentences authorized by an improper judgment of conviction). 1d.
Nonetheless, a preliminary draft of the rule specifically stated that the Rule
does not affect the availability of coram nobis in federal courts.
No express provision is made with respect either to providing for re-
lief or to barring relief under the common law writ of error coram
nobis... [nor is the] existing power of the court to grant any type of
relief from judgments or orders which is not expressly provided for in
the rules [limited].
FED. R. CRIm. P. 35 (Second Preliminary Draft 1944), quoted in Note, supra
note 3, at 791 n.22.
30. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2255, 62 Stat. 869, 967.
31. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947), reviser's note
(§ 2255), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1692, 1908. Sec-
tion 2255 authorizes a motion to attack sentence in the district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
32. 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (5-4 decision). Morgan petitioned the District
Court for the Northern District of New York for coram nobis to remove a fed-
eral conviction. Id. at 503. The district court, treating his petition as a § 2255
motion, denied relief because Morgan was no longer in custody and a § 2255
motion is available only when the petitioner is in custody. Id. at 504. The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1953),
aff'd, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
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nobis existed as an independent post-conviction remedy in fed-
eral district courts.3s The Court rejected the government's ar-
guments that Rule 60(b) abolished comm nobis in criminal as
well as civil cases,34 that Rule 35 rendered it unnecessary,35 or
that section 2255 replaced coram nobis with an exclusive statu-
tory remedy.- Instead, the Court held that coram nobis was
available to challenge criminal judgments under the all writs
section of the Judicial Code.3 7
3. Modem Status of Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts
In the federal courts today, coram nobis is available by mo-
tion in the sentencing district court to challenge criminal con-
victions.38  The modem scope of coram nobis as a post-
conviction remedy in the federal district courts is much broader
than its traditional common law scope.39 Movants may use
coram nobis to correct constitutional or other fundamental er-
rors as well as traditional errors of fact.40 In general, the fed-
33. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511. The Morgan Court concluded that coram
nobis was available by motion in the sentencing district court. Id. at 511-12.
Commenting on the Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh Circuit stated: "the
ancient writ of error coram nobis rose phoenix-like from the ashes of Ameri-
can jurisprudence through the benign intervention of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Morgan." United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 219 (7th
Cir. 1979) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
34. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4. The Morgan Court held that a coram
nobis motion challenging a criminal judgment was a "step in the criminal
case" and, therefore, Rule 60(b) did not abolish it. Id.
35. Id. at 505-06. Coram nobis was still necessary, because Rule 35 applied
only to illegal sentences, sentences the judgment of conviction did not author-
ize. Id. at 506.
36. Id. at 510-11. The government argued that § 2255 codified the remedy
in the nature of coram nobis and limited it to situations in which the peti-
tioner was still in custody. Id. The Supreme Court held that Congress enacted
§ 2255 to meet the difficulties associated with administration of habeas corpus
and thus the section did not occupy the field of remedies in the nature of
coram nobis. Id.; see infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
37. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506-07, 512-13 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1988)).
38. See cases cited supra note 1.
39. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 592, at 429. At common law, the scope of
the writ was very limited. Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 451 n.10
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1972); Donnelly, Unconvicting the Inno-
cent, 6 VAND. L. REv. 20, 24-25 (1952); Note, supra note 3, at 788. "[lIt gener-
ally covered only clerical errors, coverture, infancy, death of a party before
judgment, and insanity at time of plea" Id
40. United States v. Wickham, 474 F. Supp. 113, 116 (C.D. Cal. 1979); see
also Mills & Herrmann, Collateral Attacks on Convictions: A Survey of Fed-
eral Remedies, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAc. & PROC. 27, 62-63 & nn.281-89 (1978)
(listing examples of circumstances in which coram nobis is available).
1990] 1069
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
eral courts have held that the scope of coram nobis is as broad
as a section 2255 motion to vacate sentence.41 Yet coram nobis
is available only when section 2255 motions and other forms of
relief, such as common law habeas corpus, are not.4 This situa-
tion usually occurs when the petitioner is not in custody, be-
cause unlike section 2255 and habeas corpus, coram nobis has
no custody requirement.43 Because the collateral consequences
of a federal conviction can be extremely severe,44.coram nobis
is an important part of the federal scheme of post-conviction
41. Although the Morgan Court stated that courts should allow review of
judgments through "this extraordinary remedy only under circumstances com-
pelling such action to achieve justice" and to correct errors "'of the most fun-
damental character,"' Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511, 512 (quoting United States v.
Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)), several circuit courts have held that the scope of
coram nobis as a post-conviction remedy is as broad as the scope of § 2255,
United States v. Little, 608 F.2d 296, 299 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S.
1089 (1980); United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1173 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974);
Laughlin, 474 F.2d at 452. But cf. United States v. Darnell, 716 F.2d 479, 481
n.5 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding scope of coram nobis based on Morgan more lim-
ited than scope of § 2255), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1083 (1984).
Based on the first paragraph of § 2255, the Supreme Court has stated the
grounds for relief under § 2255:
(1) "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States;" (2) "that the court was without jurisdic-
tion to impose such sentence;" (3) "that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law;," and (4) that the sentence "is other-
wise subject to collateral attack."
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-427 (1962) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1988)). Because a § 2255 motion is a substitute for habeas corpus, see notes 77-
80 and accompanying text, the grounds for a § 2255 motion also include the
grounds for a habeas corpus petition. Houser v. United States, 508 F.2d 509,
512 (8th Cir. 1974).
42. E.g., United States v. Brown, 413 F.2d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970); Adam v. United States, 274 F.2d 880, 882 (10th Cir.
1960); L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36, at 165; C. WRIGH'T, supra note 2, § 592, at
433.
43. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36, at 165; see, e-g., Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510-
11; Byrnes v. United States, 408 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 395 U.S.
986 (1969); Azzone v. United States, 341 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 943 (1965); United States v. Lavelle, 306 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1962); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 596, at 470-71. Some courts consider a modern coram
nobis motion a § 2255 motion without a custody requirement. See cases cited
supra note 41.
Although in most common post-conviction situations the movant still is in
custody, comam nobis is the only remedy available aside from a presidential
pardon when the movant is not in custody. See Note, supra note 3, at 789-90.
The concept of "custody" under § 2255 is extremely broad. Any conditions sig-
nificantly confining the petitioner will suffice (e.g., a petitioner on parole, pro-
bation, or suspended sentence still is in custody). C. WRIGHT, supra note 2,
§ 596, at 471-73. Yet once the government unconditionally releases the peti-
tioner, coram nobis is the only collateral remedy available. See id. at 470-71.
44. See supra note 3.
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remedies. 45
4. The Morgan Footnote Paradox
At common law, a petition for writ of coram nobis was an
independent civil proceeding governed by civil rules,4 but foot-
note four to the Supreme Court's opinion in Morgan47 has ren-
dered uncertain its modern status as a civil or criminal
proceeding in the federal courts.48 In the first part of footnote
four, the Supreme Court concluded that, as amended, Rule
60(b) did not abolish coram nobis in criminal cases, because a
coram nobis proceeding is "a step in the criminal case and not
... the beginning of a separate civil proceeding." 49 According
to some courts, this description of coram nobis meant that
coram nobis was criminal in nature and the criminal rules gov-
erned coram nobis proceedings.- ° In the second part of the
same footnote, however, the Court stated that a coram nobis
proceeding "is of the same general character as [a motioni
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255."51 According to other courts, this state-
ment indicated that coram nobis was civil in nature, because at
the time courts viewed section 2255 motions as civil proceedings
and applied the civil rules to section 2255 motions.52 Whether a
coram nobis motion is a civil or criminal proceeding turns on
the solution to the Morgan footnote's paradoxical language.
45. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 789-91 (arguing absence of coram
nobis in federal courts constituted unreasonable and unfair discrimination
against ex-prisoners). The Morgan Court probably revived coram nobis
mainly to provide relief in warranted circumstances otherwise barred by the
custody requirement. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 51, at 226.
46. L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36, at 164.
47. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4. Footnote four reads:
Such a motion is a step in the criminal case and not, like habeas
corpus where relief is sought in a separate case and record, the begin-
ning of a separate civil proceeding. While at common law the writ of
error coram nobis was issued out of chancery like other writs, the
procedure by motion in the case is now the accepted American prac-
tice. As it is such a step, we do not think that Rule 60(b), expressly
abolishing the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases, applies. This
motion is of the same general character as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
IM (citations omitted).
48. See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36, at 165 (discussing the par-
adoxical nature of the Morgan footnote); infra notes 110-19 and accompanying
text (detailing circuit split).
49. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 nA.
50. See Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(1971).
51. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506 n.4.
52. See United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968).
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B. SECTION 2255
The Morgan footnote cannot be addressed without first ex-
amining section 2255. Congress enacted section 2255 in 1948,53
providing federal prisoners with a motion to vacate sentence,5
which when available, supersedes common law habeas corpus
as a means of post-conviction relief.5 As enacted, a section
2255 motion was distinct from habeas corpus.5 In practice,
53. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2255, 62 Stat. 869, 967.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) provides:
Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to im-
pose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maxi-
mum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside
or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclu-
sively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney,
grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to col-
lateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judg-
ment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without re-
quiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second
or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order
entered on the motion as from the final judgment on application for a
writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner
who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this sec-
tion, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed
to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or
that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.
IdH
55. A § 2255 motion directly supersedes habeas corpus as a post-conviction
remedy. If adequate relief is possible under § 2255, it is the exclusive remedy
and the prisoner is barred from seeking habeas corpus. See Thornton v.
United States, 368 F.2d 822, 825 & n.5, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1988); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 591, at 425-26; L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 30,
at 154.
56. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 591, at 423-28. The language of § 2255
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however, the motion quickly evolved into the equivalent of
habeas corpus,57 replacing it.m
A section 2255 motion resembles the basic form of coram
nobis, as opposed to habeas corpus, in that the movant seeks re-
lief in the sentencing district, not the district of confinement.59
Yet courts have interpreted a section 2255 motion as the sub-
stantive equivalent of habeas corpus in the sentencing district.60
The following discussions examine the legislative history and
judicial interpretation of section 2255 and the rules of proce-
dure applicable to section 2255 motions.
1. Legislative History of Section 2255
Section 2255 originated as a bill that the Judicial Confer-
ence of Senior Circuit Judges 61 proposed to correct serious ad-
clearly indicates that a § 2255 motion is distinct from habeas corpus. Section
2255 authorizes an application for writ of habeas corpus if a § 2255 motion is
"inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner's] detention." 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
The scope of § 2255 is also distinct from habeas corpus. Section 2255 not
only authorizes a district court to vacate a judgment and discharge the pris-
oner as under habeas corpus, but also authorizes the district court to provide a
more flexible remedy such as resentencing the prisoner or granting a new
trial. rd.; see also S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1944) (discussing
distinction between habeas corpus and proposed bill that served as basis for
§ 2255).
57. See ii'fra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (detailing analysis that
led to this conclusion).
58. In practice, a § 2255 motion is rarely unavailable or inadequate to test
the legality of the conviction. Section 2255 motions effectively have replaced
habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners. C. WRIGHT,
supra note 2, § 591, at 426-27; L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 30, at 154. One com-
mentator even suggested that every decision granting habeas corpus on the
grounds that a § 2255 motion is inadequate or unavailable appears to have been
decided incorrectly. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 591, at 427-28. Section 2255 ef-
fectively has become statutory habeas corpus for federal convictions. See L.
YACKLE, supra note 7, § 30, at 152-55.
59. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221 n.36 (1952).
60. Eg., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (citing legislative
history of § 2255).
61. Congress established the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges
in 1922. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838-39. The Judicial
Conference originally comprised the senior judges of the circuit courts and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1948, Congress changed the body's
name to the "Judicial Conference of the United States" and altered the mem-
bership to comprise the chief judge of each circuit court and the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 331, 62 Stat. 869, 902
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C § 331 (1988)). The Judicial Conference cur-
rently includes the chief judge of the Court of International Trade and a dis-
trict judge from each judicial circuit as well. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The
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ministrative problems associated with habeas corpus.62 By the
middle of the twentieth century the number of habeas corpus
applications had risen dramatically.63 The district courts enter-
tained many claims that appeared meritorious on their face, but
were actually repetitious or frivolous.6 In addition, the trial
records, located in the sentencing district, often were not read-
ily available to the habeas corpus court located in the district of
confinementa 5 Finally, habeas corpus petitions were concen-
trated in the few federal districts with federal prisons.66
The Judicial Conference's recommendation for solving
these administrative problems included a bill creating a distinct
collateral attack in the sentencing court (jurisdictional bill).67
Although this new remedy was in the nature of coram nobis
because it originated in the sentencing district, the judicial con-
ference intended it to be broader than coram nobis, as broad as
habeas corpus.68 The purpose of the jurisdictional bill was to
Judicial Conference examines the condition of business in the courts of the
United States and recommends legislation to Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
62. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219. In 1942, the Judicial Conference created the
Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure to address these problems and rec-
ommend changes. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CiCurr JUDGES, REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR Cmcurr JUDGES 18 (1942).
63. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212. The annual volume of applications tripled in
the years before adoption of § 2255 in 1948. The Hayman Court cited figures
from 1936 to 1945 showing an increase in habeas corpus applications filed in
the district courts from an annual average of 310 to 845, while the number of
prisoners released only increased from an annual average of 22 to 26. Id. at
212 n.13.
64. Id. at 212-13.
65. Id The Court noted that up to 40% of habeas corpus applications be-
tween 1943-45 were repetitious. IM (citing Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas
Corpus, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 352 (1949)).
66. Id. at 213-14. The Court indicated that 5 of 84 judicial districts re-
ceived 65% of the habeas corpus applications in the 6 years before enactment
of § 2255. Although habeas corpus trials averaged only 3% of all trials in all
the districts, they ranged from 20% to 65% in the 5 districts. Id. (citing Speck,
supra note 65, at 352).
67. Id. at 214-15. The Judicial Conference's recommendation also included
another bill containing procedural changes to prevent abuse of habeas corpus
(procedural bill). Id at 215.
68. Statement from Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus
Procedure to Chairmen of House and Senate Judiciary Committees (1944)
[hereinafter Judicial Conference Statement], quoted in Hayman, 342 U.S. at
217 & n.25. The Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure
prepared the Statement describing the necessity and purpose of the bills at the
request of the chairpersons of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.
Hayman, 342 U.S. at 215-16. In reference to § 2 of the jurisdictional bill, the
Statement reads:
This section applies only to Federal sentences. It creates a statu-
tory remedy consisting of a motion before the court where the movant
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relieve pressure on districts with federal prisons6 9 by effec-
tively replacing habeas corpus in the district of confinement
with this new motion in the sentencing district.70
The Senate eventually passed the Judicial Conference's ju-
risdictional bill, but the House did not and the bill never be-
came law.71 Instead, Congress incorporated the jurisdictional
bill into a comprehensive revision of Title 28 of the United
States Code as section 2255 (comprehensive bill). 72 Although
the language differed slightly, section 2255 was essentially the
has been convicted. The remedy is in the nature of, but much broader
than, coram nobis. The motion remedy broadly covers all situations
where the sentence is "open to collateral attack." As a remedy, it is
intended to be as broad as habeas corpus.
Judicial Conference Statement, supra, quoted in Hayman, 342 U.S. at 217.
69. JuDicIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR Cmcurr JUDGES, REPORT OF THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUrr JUDGES 22-24 (1943).
70. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175 (1949).
71. Both of the Judicial Conference's recommended bills were introduced
in the House of Representatives and the Senate during the first session of the
79th Congress. 91 CONG. REc. 9210 (1945) (procedural bill: H.R. 4232, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), jurisdictional bill: 4232, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)); id
at 9295 (procedural bill: S. 1452, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), jurisdictional bill:
S. 1451, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)). Neither house took action on either bill.
Id. index at 789, 910 (history of bills and resolutions). The jurisdictional bill
was reintroduced with minor changes in the House during the second session,
92 CONG. REC. 6617 (1946) (H.R. 6723, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946)), but the
House took no action, id. index at 657 (history of bills and resolutions). This
version of the jurisdictional bill would have limited the time within which
prisoners could move to vacate sentence. The prisoner would have to move
within one year after the effective date of the Act, discovery of new facts that
serve as the basis for relief, or changes of law that serve as the basis for relief.
H.R. 6723, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
During the 80th Congress, the procedural bill and the jurisdictional bill
were again reintroduced in the Senate. 93 CONG. REC. 125 (1947) (procedural
bill: S. 20, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 94 CONG. REc. 7709-10 (1948), jurisdic-
tional bill: S. 21, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 94 CONG. REc. 7710 (1948)). The
Senate passed the procedural and jurisdictional bills, id. at 7709-10, and for-
warded them to the House, which once again took no action, id, index at 513
(history of bills and resolutions).
72. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 218; see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2255, 62
Stat. 869, 967; H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). In the 79th
Congress, the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws proposed a com-
prehensive revision of Title 28. 92 CONG. REc. 9936 (1946) (H.R. 7124, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946)). The House referred the comprehensive bill to the
Committee of the Whole House, a, and took no further action, id. index at
667 (history of bills and resolutions). The comprehensive bill was reintroduced
in the House during the 80th Congress. 93 CONG. REc. 1154 (1947) (H.R. 2055,
80th Cong., 1st Seass. (1947), substituted in committee by H.R. 3214, 80th Cong.,
1st Seass. (1947)). The House passed the comprehensive bill and sent it to the
Senate. Id. at 8392. The Senate passed the bill with certain amendments, id.
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same as the second section of the jurisdictional bill.73
Congressional committee reports on the Judicial Confer-
ence's proposed jurisdictional bill and on the comprehensive
bill shed some light on the nature of a section 2255 motion and
the motion's relationship to corm nobis.74 The Senate report
at 7930, none of which affected § 2255, see i&t at 7929. The House later con-
curred in the Senate amendments. Id at 8501.
Congress has made only one minor amendment to § 2255 since its enact-
ment. The amendment substituted "court established by Act of Congress" for
"court of the United States," clarifying that § 2255 applied to federal courts in
U.S. territories as well as states. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 114, 63 Stat.
105.
73. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) (setting forth prisoner's "remedies on
motion attacking sentence") with H.R. 4233, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1945)
(setting forth jurisdictional language); S. 1451, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1945)
(same) and S. 21, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1947), 94 CoNG. REc. 7710 (1948)
(same). Section 2 of the jurisdictional bill reads in pertinent part:
Any prisoner in custody pursuant to a judgment of conviction of a
court of the United States, claiming the right to be released on the
ground that the judgment has been obtained in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum pre-
scribed by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, may apply by
motion, formally or informally, to the court in which the judgment
was rendered to vacate or set aside the judgment, notwithstanding the
expiration of the term at which such judgment was entered. Such
court shall thereupon cause notice of the motion to be served upon
the United States attorney and grant a prompt hearing thereon and
find the facts with respect to the issues raised thereon. If the court
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum prescribed by law or
otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there were errors in the
sentence which should be corrected, or that there has been such a de-
nial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to
render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall
vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or
resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may
appear appropriate. An appeal from an order granting or denying the
motion shall lie to the circuit court of appeals. No circuit or district
judge of the Untied States shall entertain an application for writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of any prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to the provisions of this section, unless it
appears that it has not been or will not be practicable to determine his
rights to discharge from custody on such a motion because of his in-
ability to be present at the hearing on such motion, or for other
reasons.
H.R. 4233, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1945); S. 1451, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1945); S. 21, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1947), 94 CONG. REc. 7710 (1948). For
the language of § 2255, see supra note 54.
74. These reports include: the House report accompanying the compre-
hensive bill introduced in the 80th Congress, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. A180 (1947), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1692,
1908; the Senate report accompanying the jurisdictional bill introduced in the
80th Congress, S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948); and the Senate
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on the jurisdictional bill indirectly described the motion under
section two of the bill, the section 2255 prototype, as a step in
the criminal process as opposed to an independent civil action.
The report distinguished the motion from habeas corpus, which
"is a separate civil action and not a further step in the criminal
case in which petitioner is sentenced."75 The House report ac-
companying the comprehensive bill included reviser's notes ex-
plaining each section of the bill. The reviser's note to section
2255 described the section as a substitute for habeas corpus "in
the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. '76
2. Judicial Interpretation of Section 2255
In interpreting section 2255, the Supreme Court has em-
phasized its purpose as a substitute for habeas corpus more
than its form in the nature of coram nobis. In 1952, the Court
considered a challenge to section 2255 as an unconstitutional
denial of habeas corpus in United States v. Hayman.77 The
report accompanying the amended comprehensive bill, S. REP. No. 1559, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI. NEWS 1675,
1683.
75. S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948) (citations omitted). This
language is quite similar to the language the Morgan Court used to describe
coram nobis, "a step in the criminal case." United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502, 505 n.4 (1954).
76. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947), reviser's note
(§ 2255), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 1692, 1908. The
reviser's note stated in pertinent part: "Th3is section restates, clarifies and sim-
plifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It
provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without re-
sort to habeas corpus." Id. The Senate report to the comprehensive bill also
acknowledges the influence of the Judicial Conference. S. REP. No. 1559, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1675,
1683.
77. 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Hayman brought a § 2255 motion attacking a sen-
tence he was serving for forging government checks and related violations of
federal law. Hayman claimed he had been denied the right to effective coun-
sel in violation of the 6th amendment because his counsel also represented a
key prosecution witness against related charges in a separate trial. Id. at 208-
09.
The district court denied Hayman's motion to vacate his sentence and
grant a new trial. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit raised sua sponte the con-
stitutionality of § 2255. Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456, 457-58 (9th Cir.
1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Although the Ninth Circuit decided the
case on other grounds, id. at 466, it questioned whether § 2255 was an uncon-
stitutional denial of habeas corpus, because a petitioner could not bring habeas
corpus if a motion under § 2255 was available or denied, id. at 462. The Consti-
tution provides that "[tihe Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Hayman Court avoided the constitutional question by indicat-
ing that a section 2255 motion was substantively the same as
habeas corpus.78 The Hayman Court placed great emphasis on
the origin of section 2255 as a solution to the administrative
problems associated with habeas corpus,79 concluding that the
sole purpose of section 2255 was to minimize these difficulties
by providing the same rights as habeas corpus in a more conve-
nient forum, the sentencing district.80 The Court placed far
less emphasis on the reviser's note to section 2255, rejecting the
government's argument that the reviser's note indicated section
2255 was a statutory enactment of common law coram nobis81
Instead, the phrase "in the nature of the ancient writ of error
coram nobis" merely meant that, like a coram nobis motion, a
section 2255 motion is an independent action in the sentencing
court.
8 2
In 1959, the Supreme Court refined its interpretation of a
78. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219, 223. The Hayman Court indicated that a
§ 2255 motion was the substantive equivalent of habeas corpus, id. at 219, then
declined to address the constitutional question because Hayman failed to
demonstrate that § 2255 motion was "inadequate or ineffective" to challenge
the legality of his conviction, id. at 223. By indicating that a § 2255 motion was
the substantive equivalent of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court avoided ad-
dressing the constitutionality of § 2255. Section 2255 could not be a denial of
habeas corpus, because a § 2255 motion was effectively the same remedy. See
L. YAcKLE, supra note 7, § 30, at 155; Kelley, Objectivity and Habeas Corpus:
Should Federal District Judges Be Permitted to Rule upon the Validity of
Their Own Criminal Trial Conduct?, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 44, 45 (1976).
Although the Hayman Court officially declined to address the constitutional-
ity of § 2255, the Court's analysis indicated that § 2255 was constitutional. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 591, at 424. The Supreme Court confirmed this con-
clusion in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
79. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 214-19.
80. The Hayman Court concluded that:
Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to im-
pinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convic-
tions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the
same rights in another and more convenient forum.
Id. at 219 (citing Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.RD. 171,
175 (1948) (Judge Parker served as chairperson of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure)). The Supreme Court affirmed this
position in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962).
81. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 221 n.36. Note 36 reads in pertinent part:
Congress did not adopt the coram nobis procedure as it existed at
common law, the Reviser's Note merely stating that the Section 2255
motion was "in the nature of" the coram nobis writ in the sense that
a Section 2255 proceeding, like corn nobis, is an independent action
brought in the court that entered judgment.
Id (citation omitted).
82. I&
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section 2255 motion in Heflin v. United States.83 The Heflin
Court specifically described a section 2255 motion as an in-
dependent civil action comparable to habeas corpus.84 In a foot-
note, the Heflin Court stated that a section 2255 motion, like a
petition for habeas corpus, "is not a proceeding in the original
criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit." 5
The judicial interpretation of a section 2255 motion as an
independent civil action comparable to a petition for habeas
corpus potentially conflicts with the legislative description of
section 2255 as a step in the criminal process.8 6 Nonetheless,
the interpretation of section 2255 in Hayman and Heflin repre-
sents the authoritative judicial interpretation of section 2255.87
Until adoption of special rules governing section 2255 motions
in 1976, this interpretation of section 2255 controlled the rules
of procedure applicable to section 2255 motions.88
83. 353 U.S. 415 (1959).
84. Id. at 418 n.7. In Heflin, a prisoner was convicted on two separate
counts for feloniously taking and for feloniously receiving the same property.
Heflin brought a § 2255 motion, challenging the conviction for receiving the
property. He asserted that he could not be lawfully convicted of both taking
and receiving the same property. Id. at 416-17. Heflin's sentences were con-
secutive and he had begun serving the one for taking the property, but not the
one for receiving it. Id. at 417.
The Supreme Court rejected Heflin's § 2255 motion, holding that a pris-
oner can only bring a § 2255 motion to attack a sentence under which he is in
custody. Heflin was not "in custody" under the sentence he challenged be-
cause he had not begun serving it. Id. at 418. The Court cited McNally v. Hill,
293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934), in which it held that a prisoner may not use habeas
corpus to attack a sentence that he has not begun to serve. Heflin, 358 U.S. at
418.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Heflin, the Hef-
lin Court's interpretation of the § 2255 custody requirement is no longer valid.
In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), the Court overruled McNally, holding
that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in custody" under any one
sentence for habeas corpus purposes. Id. at 67. The Sixth Circuit, in turn, has
held that Peyton's reasoning applies to § 2255 motions, effectively overruling
Heflin. Ward v. Knoblick, 738 F.2d 134, 139 (6th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1193 (1985).
85. Heflin, 358 U.S. at 418 n.7. Footnote 7 reads in pertinent part "a mo-
tion under § 2255, like a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, is not a proceed-
ing in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit." I&
(citations omitted).
36. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 1 advi-
sory committee's note.
87. United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 220 (7th Cir. 1979), cert de-
nied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 590, at 420-21.
88. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 590, at 421.
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3. Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings
Before 1976, federal courts applied the civil rules of proce-
dure to section 2255 motions at both the district and appellate
levels.8 9 The courts reasoned that a section 2255 motion was an
independent civil action comparable to habeas corpus.90 In
Hayman, the Supreme Court indicated that the rules of appel-
late procedure governing habeas corpus, the civil rules, also ap-
ply to section 2255 motions.9' The Court stated that the time
limits for appeals from final judgments in habeas corpus govern
section 2255 motions.92 The Court supported its conclusion by
citing the First Circuit's decision in Mercado v. United States.9 3
The First Circuit had stressed that the purpose of section 2255
was to provide a substitute for habeas corpus and that section
2255 explicitly permitted a movant to take appeals as in habeas
corpus.94
In 1976, the rules governing section 2255 proceedings at the
district court level changed significantly. Congress approved
special "Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the
United States District Courts" (Section 2255 Rules),95 which ap-
89. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952) (cit-
ing Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d 486, 487 (1st Cir. 1950)); United States
v. Somers, 552 F.2d 108, 110 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977); Ferrara v. United States, 547
F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
90. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 590, at 420-21; see, e.g., Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7
(1959); Hayman, 342 U.S. at 209 n.4 (citing Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d
486, 487 (1st Cir. 1950)); Balistrieri, 606 F.2d at 220; Somers, 552 F.2d at 110 n.6;
Ferrara, 547 F.2d at 862.
91. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 209 n.4 (citing Mercado, 183 F.2d at 487).
92. Id Footnote 4 reads: 'The appeal was timely. Appeals from orders
denying motions under Section 2255 are governed by the civil rules applicable
to appeals from final judgments in habeas corpus actions." Id
93. 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950). The First Circuit did not decide whether a
§ 2255 motion is a civil or criminal proceeding, but merely concluded that the
civil rules governing habeas corpus appeals applied to § 2255 appeals. Id. at
487.
94. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988)).
95. The Supreme Court originally recommended the § 2255 Rules under
its rulemaking authority. Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases and § 2255
Proceedings, 425 U.S. 1167, 1169, 1181-87 (1976). Congress eventually approved
the rules with minor amendments. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, 90
Stat. 1334, 1334-35 (1976). The § 2255 Rules became effective February 1, 1977.
Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 1, 90 Stat. 1334, 1334 (1976).
The Court recommended the § 2255 Rules along with rules governing
habeas corpus actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus for state prison-
ers) in response to growing confusion over the exact procedural rules gov-
erning habeas corpus and § 2255 motions. Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal
Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules En-
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plied a mixture of civil and criminal rules to section 2255 pro-
ceedings in the district courts.96 The advisory committee's note
to Rule 1 of the new Section 2255 Rules justified the change by
describing a section 2255 motion as a step in the criminal case
and not an independent civil suit like habeas corpus.9 7 In addi-
tion, the Section 2255 Rules provide the sentencing judge with
wide discretion to apply civil or criminal rules of procedure
when the Section 2255 Rules do not specifically prescribe which
set of rules applies.9 8 In contrast to drastically changing the
rules governing section 2255 motions at the district level, the
Section 2255 Rules did not affect the rules governing section
2255 appeals.99
C. THE CoURTS OF APPEALs' INTERPRETATIONS oF THE
MORGAN FOOTNOTE
The complex history of section 2255 is reflected in the cir-
cuit courts' interpretations of the Morgan footnote's description
of a coram nobis motion as "a step in the criminal case," yet
also as "of the same general character as [a motion] under 28
U.S.C. § 2255."1'' 0 Several circuits have addressed the appar-
ently contradictory language of the Morgan footnote's first and
second parts and are divided as to whether a petition for coram
nobis is generally a civil or a criminal proceeding.10 1
abling Acts, 63 IowA L. REV. 15, 21-22 (1977). The confusion resulted in part
from FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a)(2), which states that the rules of civil procedure ap-
ply to habeas corpus motions only to the extent that they conform to the rules
previously governing habeas corpus motions. Id. at 19. Lack of information
concerning habeas corpus practice before 1938, when the rules of civil proce-
dure became effective, left the courts uncertain as to the proper procedure.
Recognizing this uncertainty, the Court exercised its rulemaking authority to
clarify the situation. Id. at 19-22.
96. RULEs GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 3 (no
filing fee), 4(b) (availability of files, etc., relating to judgment), 6 (availability
of discovery under civil and criminal procedure rules), 11 (no extension of
time for appeal), 12 (applicability of federal civil and criminal rules).
97. Id Rule 1 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee based
its conclusion on the description of the prototype of § 2255 contained in the
Senate report to the jurisdictional bill. Iti (quoting S. REP. No. 1526, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948)); see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
98. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTs. 12.
99. Id Rule 11. This conforms with the explicit language of § 2255 per-
mitting petitioners to take appeals in the same manner as appeals in applica-
tions for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
100. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4; see supra notes 46-52
and accompanying text.
101. Yasni v. United States, 772 F2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding a
coram nobis motion criminal in nature and applying the criminal rules);
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The Second and Eighth Circuits addressed the fundamental
nature of coram nobis before the enactment of the Section 2255
Rules. In 1958, the Second Circuit held that a coram nobis mo-
tion was a civil proceeding and applied the civil time limit to
coram nobis appeals in United States v. Keogh. 0 2 The Keogh
court interpreted the first part of the Morgan footnote nar-
rowly, concluding that it merely indicated the abolition of
coram nobis under Rule 60(b) was limited to civil cases.103 The
court declined to read the footnote as indicating that a coram
nobis motion itself was a criminal proceeding.1°4 Instead, the
court emphasized the second part of the footnote. Because a
section 2255 motion is a civil proceeding subject to the time
limit governing civil appeals, the same time limit also should
apply to comparable coram nobis appeals. 05 Moreover, the
court noted that the policy considerations supporting a short
period for notice of appeal in criminal cases were absent in
coram nobis cases106
The Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion on the
United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S.
917 (1980) (holding a coram nobis motion a hybrid remedy and applying the
§ 2255 Rules, which contain a mixture of civil and criminal rules, to coram
nobis motions); United States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1970), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) (holding a coram nobis motion criminal and apply-
ing the criminal rules); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968)
(holding a coram nobis motion civil in nature and applying the civil rules to
coram nobis motions).
102. 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968). Keogh, a Justice of the Supreme Court of
New York for Kings County, was convicted of conspiracy to influence, ob-
struct, or impede justice. Facing disbarment for the conviction, Keogh brought
a coram nobis motion. Id. at 139-40. The district court denied relief, dis-
missing Keogh's motion. United States v. Keogh, 271 F. Supp. 1002, 1017
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Keogh appealed the decision 27 days after entry of the dismis-
sal. The United States contended that Keogh appealed too late because crimi-
nal rules of procedure should govern coram nobis. Keogh, 391 F.2d at 140.
103. Keogh, 391 F.2d at 140.
104. Id. The Second Circuit's assertion that the Supreme Court did not
need to view a coram nobis motion as criminal in nature to avoid application
of Rule 60(b) to coram nobis in criminal cases is reasonable. Rule 60(b) plausi-
bly did not eliminate comm nobis as a civil remedy in both civil and criminal
cases, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only to civil cases.
See FED. R. CIrv. P. 1. Rule 60(b) could only eliminate comm nobis, regardless
of its nature as a motion, as a remedy from final orders in civil cases. Conse-
quently, a comm nobis motion conceivably could be civil in nature, but still
available as a remedy from a final order in a criminal case.
105. Keogh, 391 F.2d at 140.
106. Id. The Second Circuit did not elaborate on these policy considera-
tions. Presumably, the court was referring to the government's interest in
resolving criminal litigation as expediently as possible.
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question two years later. In United States v. Mills,'°7 the
Eighth Circuit held that a coram nobis motion was a criminal
proceeding, and applied the ten-day criminal time limit for ap-
peals.'08 Ignoring the second part of the Morgan footnote, the
Mills court simply noted that the first part of the footnote de-
scribed a coram nobis motion as "a step in a criminal case."'1°
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits examined the basic nature
of coram nobis after the enactment of the Section 2255 Rules.
In 1979, the Seventh Circuit took a slightly different approach
than the Keogh court, but also applied the rules governing sec-
tion 2255 motions to coram nobis motions. In United States v.
Balistrieri,n ° the Seventh Circuit held that a coram nobis mo-
tion was a hybrid motion: a step in the criminal case that is also
civil in nature. Following the Second Circuit's analysis, the
court ruled that coram nobis is an extension of section 2255,
available when the applicant is no longer in custody."' Be-
cause coram nobis is comparable to section 2255, it is civil as
well as criminal." 2 Consequently, coram nobis proceedings are
subject to the rules governing section 2255 proceedings, which
incorporate aspects of both the civil and criminal rules." 3
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit joined the Eighth Circuit and
held that coram nobis is criminal in nature. The court applied
the criminal time limit to coram nobis appeals in Yasui v.
United States.n 4 As the Eighth Circuit had done earlier, the
107. 430 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
108. Id. at 528. Mills sought comm nobis, challenging his convictions for
escape and conspiracy to escape on the grounds that he was not mentally com-
petent to stand trial. The district court denied relief. Mills appealed the deci-
sion, but filed his appeal beyond the 10-day limit under the criminal rules. Id.
at 527-28.
109. Id. at 528.
110. 606 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). Balis-
trieri sought comm nobis to remove his conviction for filing false and fraudu-
lent income tax returns. Id. at 218. The district court denied his motion for
coram nobis and limited his discovery requests to those available under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Balistrieri, 423 F. Supp.
793 (S.D. Ill. 1976). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d at 218.
111. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d at 221.
112. Id. at 220-21 (citing Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7
(1959)). The Seventh Circuit also cited the new § 2255 Rules as support for its
comparison of coram nobis and § 2255 and its contention that coram nobis is a
hybrid remedy. Id. at 221.
113. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court was within
its authority to limit Balistrieri's discovery requests to those available under
the rules of criminal procedure, because Rule 6 of the § 2255 Rules allows the
district court to do so in § 2255 proceedings. Id.
114. 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). Yasui sought comm nobis to vacate his
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Ninth Circuit emphasized the first part of the Morgan footnote.
Because a coram nobis proceeding is a step in a criminal case in
which the petitioner seeks to set aside a criminal conviction,
the court concluded that, absent an express congressional com-
mand to the contrary, the criminal time limit applies."m The
circuit court rejected a comparison of a corm nobis motion to a
section 2255 motion, because section 2255 has a unique relation-
ship to habeas corpus. Section 2255 provides a special statutory
remedy replacing habeas corpus, and explicitly authorizes tak-
ing appeals as in habeas corpus cases. Coram nobis, in contrast,
has no such relationship with habeas corpus.-' 6
To summarize, whether a coram nobis motion is a civil or
criminal proceeding and hence, whether the criminal or civil
rules govern coram nobis appeals, turns on the paradoxical lan-
guage of the Morgan footnote.117 The varying legislative and
judicial descriptions of a section 2255 motion as a step in the
criminal process" 8 and as an independent civil action n 9 compli-
cate the problem. As a result, the circuits are divided sharply
over the basic nature of a coram nobis proceeding and conse-
quently, whether to apply the civil or criminal rules to coram
nobis appeals.
II. THE COOPER DECISION
In United States v. Cooper,20 a federal convict appealed a
district court order denying what the Fifth Circuit construed as
petitions for writs of error coram nobis.21 The court consid-
ered whether the convict's notices of appeal were timely'2 2 and
whether the documents the convict filed constituted valid no-
tices of appeal. 2 3 The circuit court held that the notices of ap-
conviction for violating wartime curfew orders the federal government im-
posed on Japanese Americans living in states along the west coast. The dis-
trict court denied relief. I&i at 1498. Yasui appealed, but filed his appeal
beyond the 10-day limit for criminal appeals. Id.
115. I& at 1499.
116. Id-
117. See supra notes 46-52.
118. See supra notes 74-76.
119. See supra notes 77-85.
120. 876 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
121. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing procedural history
of Cooper).
122. Cooper, 876 F.2d at 1193-94.
123. Id. at 1194-96. Cooper appealed two district comt orders, each denying
co'ram nobis for an earlier conviction. For each appeal, Cooper filed docu-
ments entitled "Motion for Rehearing and Notice of Appeal" and "Motion for
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peal were timely, 2 4 but that it could not determine the validity
of the notices from the record. 25 The court consequently
remanded the case to the district court for a factual
determination.126
In concluding that the notices of appeal were timely, the
Cooper court held that Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure, governing the time limit for notice of appeal
in civil cases, applies to a coram nobis motion, because such a
motion is a civil proceeding.127 The court based its holding on
the Morgan footnote's comparison of a coram nobis motion to a
Leave to Proceed In Fornma Pauperis" as well as appellate briefs. Id at 1194-
95.
124. Id. at 1194. The Cooper court applied the FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1) 60-
day limit for notice of appeal in civil cases. Id.
125. I& at 1196. The Cooper court held that the documents entitled "Mo-
tion for Rehearing and Notice of Appeal" were invalid notices of appeal. Id. at
1194. The Fifth Circuit followed a previous decision in which it held such a
motion an invalid notice of appeal because the motion does not clearly demon-
strate an intention to appeal as opposed to an intention to move for rehearing.
The court stated that a motion for rehearing and notice of appeal "cannot be a
valid notice of appeal because it does not 'clearly [evince] the party's intent to
appeal."' Id. (citation omitted).
The Cooper court also rejected the claim that Cooper's appellate briefs
were adequate notices of appeal. Id at 1196. Although the briefs otherwise
met the requirements of FED. R. AP. P. 3 and 4, the court held that the rules
envisioned the notice of appeal and the appellate brief as two separate filings.
Allowing parties to file only an appellate brief would eliminate the require-
ment to file a notice of appeal. Id.
The Cooper court did hold that Cooper's documents entitled 'Motion for
Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" were equivalent to notices of appeal and
sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 1194-95. These "notices of ap-
peal," however, were potentially invalid as premature. The court noted that
under FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), a notice of appeal is invalid if filed before dispo-
sition of a timely motion for rehearing under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). Id at 1195.
Because Cooper's failed motions for notice of appeal also were motions for re-
hearing under Rule 59(e) and he filed his motions for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis before disposition of these motions, his notices of appeal were
invalid as premature if his motions for rehearing were timely. Id. With cer-
tain limitations not relevant in Cooper, a motion for rehearing served within
10 days is timely. Id. Because the record does not indicate when Cooper
served his motions for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit could not determine
whether these motions were timely and hence whether Cooper's motions for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis were valid notices of appeal. I& The court
remanded the issue to the district court to determine the timeliness of
Cooper's motions for rehearing. Id. at 1196.
126. Id-
127. Id at 1194. The Cooper court concluded that "[s]ince the cormm nobis
motion is a civil proceeding 'of the same general character as one under 28
U.S.C. § 2255,' the same civil appeal rule of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) applies.
Thus, Cooper had 60 days to file this appeal." Id (quoting United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 n.4 (1954)).
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section 2255 motion, noting that the rules governing civil ap-
peals govern section 2255 appeals. 28
The Cooper court asserted that the first part of the Morgan
footnote simply distinguished habeas corpus from coram nobis
by the different districts in which the two proceedings initiated.
As an independent civil action, habeas corpus originates in the
district of confinement, while as "a step in the criminal case,"
coram nobis originates in the sentencing district.129
The Cooper court supported its comparison of a coram
nobis motion to a section 2255 motion by citing the Section 2255
Rules.2 ° The advisory committee's note to Rule 1 describes a
section 2255 motion as "a further step in the movant's criminal
case and not a separate civil action."'131 The Cooper court
stressed the similarity of this description of a section 2255 mo-
tion to the Supreme Court's description of a coram nobis mo-
tion in the first part of the Morgan footnote, as well as the
explicit comparison of coram nobis to section 2255 in the second
part of the footnote. 32 The court concluded that a coram nobis
motion was a civil proceeding comparable to a section 2255 mo-
tion,12 and thus the rules of appellate procedure for civil cases
128. Id. The Cooper court stated that coram nobis is civil in nature, like
§ 2255. This language is potentially confusing since the enactment of the
§ 2255 Rules, applying both criminal and civil rules to § 2255 proceedings. The
Cooper court simply concluded that like a § 2255 motion, the civil rules of ap-
pellate procedure govern coram nobis. The court did not address whether the
combination of civil and criminal rules in the § 2255 Rules or the civil rules
would apply to coram nobis at the district level. See id.
129. Id. at 1194.
130. Id,
131. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS iN THE U.S. DisT. CTs. 1 advi-
sory committee's note (quoting S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948)).
The Senate report read in pertinent part:
[One of the] main advantages of such motion remedy over the present
habeas corpus [is that] habeas corpus is a separate civil action and not
a further step in the criminal case in which petitioner is sentenced. It
is not a determination of guilt or innocence of the charge upon which
petitioner was sentenced.... Even under the broad power in the stat-
ute "to dispose of the party as law and justice require," the court [or]
judge is by no means in the same advantageous position in habeas
corpus to do justice as would be so if the matter were determined in
the criminal proceeding. For instance, the judge (by habeas corpus)
cannot grant a new trial in the criminal case. Since the motion rem-
edy is in the criminal proceeding, this section 2 affords the opportu-
nity and expressly gives the broad powers to set aside the judgment
and to "discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."
S. REP. No. 1526, 80th'Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948) (citations omitted).
132. Cooper, 876 F.2d at 1194.
133. Id
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should govern coram nobis appeals because such rules govern
section 2255 appeals. 1'
III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE MORGAN FOOTNOTE
INDICATES THAT CORAM NOBIS IS A
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
Unlike with section 2255, the Supreme Court has neither
directly addressed the basic nature of coram nobis nor specifi-
cally indicated which rules of procedure apply to coram nobis
proceedings.135 The only guide the lower courts have is the
paradoxical Morgan footnote.'1
The answer to whether coram nobis is civil or criminal in
nature, therefore, turns on the solution to the Morgan footnote
paradox. A proper interpretation of the basic nature of coram
nobis would reconcile the apparently contradictory language of
the first and second parts of the Morgan footnote. An interpre-
tation of coram nobis as a civil proceeding fails because the first
part of the Morgan footnote must be read as indicating that
coram nobis is criminal in nature. Yet an interpretation of
coram nobis as a criminal proceeding succeeds. The second
part of the Morgan footnote need not be read as indicating that
coram nobis is a civil proceeding. Furthermore, policy consid-
erations underlying the administration of post-conviction reme-
dies support an interpretation of coram nobis as a criminal
proceeding, because it is an extension of the original criminal
case.
A. THE COOPER COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF CORAM NoBIs AS
A CIVIL PROCEEDING
The circuit court interpretations of the Morgan footnote
prior to Cooper 13 7 failed to reconcile both of its parts. The Sec-
134. I&
135. See L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36, at 165.
136. See i&. § 36, at 163-65. Yackle notes that Morgan's holding as well as
footnote four is paradoxical. The Supreme Court held that § 2255 did not su-
persede coram nobis, but described a coram nobis motion as having the same
general character as a § 2255 motion. Id at 165. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a § 2255 motion as an independent civil action compa-
rable to habeas corpus renders the Morgan footnote indirectly self-contradic-
tory. Id. The Morgan Court distinguished a coram nobis motion from habeas
corpus, then compared a coram nobis motion to a § 2255 motion, which the
Court earlier held was the substantial equivalent of habeas corpus in Hayman.
Thus the Morgan Court effectively stated that a coram nobis motion is both
different from and the same as habeas corpus. Id
137. See supra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
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ond Circuit read the first part narrowly, virtually ignoring its
language, and emphasized the second part in concluding that a
coram nobis proceeding is civil. 1as The Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged the contradictory nature of the different parts of
the footnote and simply declared a coram nobis motion both
civil and criminal in nature.139 Finally, the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits stressed the first part of the footnote and completely
138. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second
Circuit reasoned:
The problem to which the [Morgan] footnote was addressed was that
F[ed]. R. Civ. P. 60(b) had abolished writs of error coram nobis in
favor of the motion procedure there provided. The answer was that
the abolition effected by Rule 60(b) cannot fairly be extended beyond
the "suits of a civil nature" to which alone, under the general provi-
sion of Rule 1, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply. We do not read
the quoted statement as intending more than that. Indeed the foot-
note ends by characterizing a motion for coram nobis as "of the same
general character as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2255," which, as indicated
above, is under the civil rules as regards time for appeal.
I&i (citations omitted).
139. United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 221 (7th Cir. 1979), cert de-
nied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). The Seventh Circuit stated that "to the extent that a
coram nobis motion is like a § 2255 motion, the former is also civil in nature."
Id. at 220-21. Apparently, then, a coram nobis motion is a step in a criminal
proceeding, yet is also civil in nature and subject to the civil rules of proce-
dure. Id. at 221. The Seventh Circuit quoted Judge Scott in United States v.
Tyler, 413 F. Supp. 1403 (M.D. Fla. 1976):
Coram nobis is, then, a hybrid action: quasi-civil and quasi-criminal.
It is a remedy available in a criminal case to correct fundamental er-
rors that render that proceeding irregular and its judgment invalid.
Nevertheless, because it is a postjudgment attack upon a conviction by
a defendant no longer in any form of custody, and insofar as it is still
governed by civil rules, forms and pleadings, its character reflects the
vestiges of its civil origins: the intrinsic all-writs jurisdiction of the
Court.
Id. at 1404-05 (citations omitted), quoted in Balistrieri, 606 F.2d at 221.
The Seventh Circuit also emphasized that the § 2255 Rules incorporate as-
pects of both the civil and criminal rules at the district level, strengthening its
conclusion that coram nobis is comparable to § 2255 and is a hybrid remedy.
Id-
Although the Seventh Circuit's description of corm nobis as a hybrid
remedy differs from the Second Circuit's, in practice this difference affects
only district level procedure. Following the § 2255 Rules, the Seventh Circuit
applied criminal rules to certain aspects of a corm nobis proceeding at the
district level. Id at 220-21 (holding it within district court discretion to apply
the criminal rules of discovery to a coram nobis proceeding). At the appellate
level, the Seventh Circuit's position is consistent with the Second Circuit.
Judge Scott, and in turn the Seventh Circuit, actually based his analysis on the
Second Circuit's decision in Keogh, concluding that coram nobis was quasi-civil
because the civil rules applied to comm nobis appeals. See Tyler, 413 F. Supp.
at 1404 (citing Keogh, 391 F.2d at 140). Thus the Seventh Circuit is consistent
with the Second Circuit in respect to corm nobis appeals. The civil rules of
procedure apply to comam nobis appeals. See Balistrieri, 606 F.2d at 220-21.
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ignored the second part in concluding that a coram nobis mo-
tion is criminal in nature.14
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Cooper represents the first
attempt to reconcile the language of both parts of the Morgan
footnote. On its face, the Cooper court's analysis appears to suc-
ceed.' 41 Yet on closer examination, the court's reasoning
breaks down. The Cooper court's approach fails to acknowledge
the unique relationship of section 2255 to habeas corpus result-
ing from the purpose of section 2255 to replace habeas corpus
for federal prisoners.
1. The Cooper Court's Interpretation of the Language of the
First Part of the Morgan Footnote
According to the Cooper court, the first part of the Morgan
footnote simply distinguished habeas corpus, which originates
in the district of confinement, from coram nobis, which
originates in the sentencing district.' 42 Examined by itself,
however, the language of the first part of the footnote describ-
ing a coram nobis motion as "a step in the criminal case" does
not support such a narrow reading.
Although the Cooper court's narrow interpretation is plau-
sible considering only the footnote's relationship to Rule 60(b),
the interpretation is not plausible considering the footnote's
text as well. In contending that the phrase "a step in the crimi-
nal case" does not imply that a coram nobis motion is a crimi-
nal proceeding, the circuit court takes a questionable position.
140. United States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1970), cert denied,
400 U.S. 1023 (1971); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Eighth Circuit simply concluded that "[the criminal] rule seems to cover
the instant proceeding, since coram nobis is deemed a step in a criminal case."
Mills, 430 F.2d at 528. The Ninth Circuit's analysis was deeper than the Eighth
Circuit's, but still was very limited. It stated that coram nobis is "as the
Supreme Court stated in Morgan, 'a step in the criminal case.' The purpose of
the petition is the setting aside of the petitioner's criminal indictment and con-
viction. Absent an express congressional command to the contrary, the crimi-
nal time limit should therefore apply." Yasui, 772 F.2d at 1499.
141. The Cooper court's comparison of the language of the first part of the
Morgan footnote, describing a coram nobis motion as "a step in the criminal
case," to the advisory committee's note to Rule 1 of the § 2255 Rules, describ-
ing a § 2255 motion as "a further step in the movant's criminal case," trans-
forms the standard interpretation of the footnote. Under the Fifth Circuit's
analysis, the first part of the Morgan footnote supports a comparison of coram
nobis to § 2255, indicating that coram nobis is civil, not criminal. United States
v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Thus both the first
and the second parts of the footnote imply the same conclusion: a coram nobis
motion is a civil proceeding.
142. See id. at 1194.
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As the Ninth Circuit noted, a proceeding that is a "step in the
criminal case" normally would be criminal, not civil.143 Fur-
thermore, the Cooper court's analysis completely fails to ad-
dress another phrase from the first part of the Morgan
footnote. The Morgan Court states that coram nobis is "not...
the beginning of a separate civil proceeding."'144 Again the nat-
ural inference of this language is that coram nobis is criminal,
not civil, in nature.145
Had the Supreme Court intended to distinguish between
coram nobis and habeas corpus based on the different districts
in which they originate, presumably the Court would have used
language contrasting the districts. Yet the Morgan Court did
not use such language.'4 6 Instead, the Court contrasted the na-
ture of coram nobis with the nature of habeas corpus.147 The
footnote's language, "a step in the criminal case and not, like
habeas corpus.., the beginning of a separate civil proceeding,"
indicates that the distinction between coram nobis and habeas
corpus was that a coram nobis proceeding is criminal as op-
posed to civil in nature, not that a coram nobis proceeding
originates in the sentencing district as opposed to the district of
confinement."4
The Cooper court attempted to overcome the plain lan-
guage of the first part of the Morgan footnote and reconcile it
with the second part by quoting the advisory committee's note
to Rule 1 of the Section 2255 Rules. The note describes a sec-
tion 2255 motion as "a further step in the movant's criminal
case and not a separate civil action."'149 Although a section 2255
motion is a step in the criminal case and the criminal rules gov-
ern many aspects of section 2255 proceedings at the district
level, the civil rules still govern section 2255 appeals.150 Assur-
143. Yasui, 772 F.2d at 1499. The ABA also has criticized the Supreme
Court's classification of § 2255, an extension of the criminal proceeding, as civil
in nature. "[It is anomalous to have an extension of a criminal proceeding
characterized as purely civil." STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 22-1.2 com-
mentary at 22-10.
144. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954).
145. Yasui, 772 F.2d at 1499.
146. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4.
147. Id
148. See generally Yasui, 772 F.2d at 1499 (applying the criminal time limit
because the Morgan footnote expressly states that a coram nobis motion is "a
step in the criminal case").
149. United States v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam) (quoting RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST.
CTs. 1 advisory committee's note).
150. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 11.
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ing for a moment that this description of section 2255 is valid,
the first and second parts of the Morgan footnote are no longer
paradoxical. The language of the first part of the Morgan foot-
note does not necessarily indicate that the criminal rules should
govern coram nobis proceedings.' 5 ' Instead, the language actu-
ally supports the comparison between coram nobis and section
2255 motions in the second part of the Morgan footnote. 5 2
Thus both parts of the footnote indicate that the civil rules
should govern cram nobis as well as section 2255 appeals. 53
The Cooper court's description of a section 2255 motion as a
step in the criminal case is a flawed basis for interpreting the
Morgan footnote, however, because the courts viewed a section
2255 motion as a civil proceeding when the Supreme Court de-
cided Morgan. The advisory committee note's description of a
section 2255 motion, and hence the Cooper court's, is based on
the Senate report discussing the Judicial Conference's proposed
jurisdictional bill, the prototype of section 2255.1' 4 The Senate
report may have described the prototype as a step in the crimi-
nal process, but the federal judiciary consistently interpreted a
section 2255 motion, from the enactment of section 2255 to the
adoption of the current Section 2255 Rules, as an independent
civil action comparable to habeas corpus, not as a step in the
criminal case.155 Moreover, the courts applied the civil rules to
151. The words "a step in the criminal case" do not necessarily imply that
the criminal rules should apply to coram nobis appeals because a § 2255 mo-
tion is "a further step in the movant's criminal case," yet the civil rules govern
§ 2255 appeals. Therefore, the description of a coram nobis motion as "a step
in the criminal case" does not preclude applying the civil rules to coram nosbis
appeals.
152. The first part of the Morgan footnote now complements the second
part, because both a coram nobis and a § 2255 motion are steps in the criminal
process.
153. See Cooper, 876 F.2d at 1194. The language of both the first and the
second part of the Morgan footnote supports a comparison between a coram
nobis motion and a § 2255 motion. Because the civil rules govern § 2255 ap-
peals, both parts of the footnote support application of the civil rules to coram
nobis appeals.
154. See RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTs. 1
advisory committee's note (quoting S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1948)); see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the legis-
lative history of § 2255).
155. See cases cited supra note 90. Whether a § 2255 motion is civil or
criminal in nature was not originally clear. Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d
486, 486-87 (1st Cir. 1950). The First Circuit noted that the relationship of
§ 2255 to coram nobis suggests that § 2255 might be criminal (assuming that
coram nobis is criminal, which was itself uncertain), while its relationship to
habeas corpus suggests that it is civil. I&i at 487.
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section 2255 motions based on this comparison to habeas
corpus. 15 6
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly state that
section 2255 was an independent civil action comparable to
habeas corpus until 1959 in Heflin v. United States,15 7 as early
as 1952 in United States v. Hayman, the Court described section
2255 as "an independent and collateral inquiry into the validity
of the conviction."' 58  Furthermore, to avoid addressing
whether section 2255 was an unconstitutional denial of habeas
corpus,159 the Hayman Court effectively held that a section
2255 motion was the equivalent of habeas corpus, only "afford-
ing the same rights in another and more convenient forum,"
the sentencing district instead of the district of confinement.16°
156. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952) (citing Mercado,
183 F.2d at 486).
157. 358 U.S. 415 (1959). In Heflin, the Supreme Court explicitly con-
firmed that a § 2255 motion is an independent civil action. IMi at 418 n.7.
158. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 222.
159. See Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456, 466 (9th Cir. 1951), vacated,
342 U.S. 205 (1952).
160. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219. The Supreme Court held that § 2255 ef-
fectively provided the same rights as habeas corpus, only in a different forum.
Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to im-
pinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convic-
tions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the
difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the
same rights in another and more convenient forum.
E Although the Court did not reach the constitutional challenge, id. at 223,
this analysis clearly would have refuted it. Section 2255 could not be a denial
of the very rights it embodied. Consequently, Hayman effectively established
the constitutionality of § 2255. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 591, at 424. The
Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of § 2255 in Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962), stating that "the historic context in which
§ 2255 was enacted [indicates] that the legislation was intended simply to pro-
vide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which
had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district
where the prisoner was confined." Id
Hayman and Hill directly conflict with the Senate report on the precursor
to § 2255. The Senate report clearly describes a motion to attack sentence as a
step in the criminal case, S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948), yet
Hayman refers to it as an independent collateral inquiry, Hayman, 342 U.S. at
222. Furthermore, the Senate report distinguishes the proposed motion from
habeas corpus and describes it as superior to habeas corpus in criminal pro-
ceedings (a judge only could release a petitioner in habeas corpus, while she
could adjust the sentence in a motion to attack sentence). S. REP. No. 1526,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948). Yet Hill explicitly describes the two actions as
equivalent remedies. Hill, 368 U.S. at 427. The advisory committee's note to
Rule 1 of the § 2255 Rules that describes § 2255 as a step in the criminal pro-
cess based on the Senate report, reflects this conflict between the legislative
history and judicial interpretation of § 2255. See RULES GOVERNING § 2255
PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 1 advisory committee's note; see also C.
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The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2255 as an
independent civil action like habeas corpus precludes the
Cooper court from using the legislative description of a section
2255 motion as a step in the criminal case as a basis for inter-
preting the Morgan footnote. As such, the Fifth Circuit's at-
tempt to explain the paradoxical language of the footnote fails.
The language of the first part of the Morgan footnote still im-
plies that a coram nobis proceeding is criminal in nature,161
contradicting the second part of the footnote, which implies
that a coram nobis proceeding is civil.
2. Unique Relationship of Section 2255 to Habeas Corpus
Even if the Cooper court's description of a section 2255 mo-
tion as a step in the criminal case is not historically accurate,
the description still might conceivably serve as a basis for inter-
preting the words "a step in the criminal case."162 The advisory
committee's note to Rule 1 of the Section 2255 Rules does de-
scribe section 2255 as "a further step in the movant's criminal
case,":163 yet the Section 2255 Rules apply the civil time limit to
section 2255 appeals.164 This implies that application of civil
rules to a proceeding that is a step in the criminal process is not
necessarily contradictory.
This description of a section 2255 motion, however, is mis-
leading as a guide for interpreting the Morgan footnote. The
Supreme Court first applied the civil rules to section 2255 ap-
peals, and the civil rules still apply to such appeals under the
current section 2255 rules, because of a unique relationship be-
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 590, at 422 (questioning significance of Senate report
compared to longstanding judicial interpretation as basis for rules governing
§ 2255 proceedings).
Yackle suggests that a desire to avoid the Ninth Circuit's constitutional
challenge to § 2255 may have motivated the Hayman Court to interpret § 2255
as the equivalent of habeas corpus. See L. YACKLE, supra note 7, §§ 30, 32.
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2255 in
Hayman was accurate or skewed as a result of the constitutional challenge, it
reflects the Court's position on § 2255 at the time it decided Morgan. The
Supreme Court almost certainly viewed § 2255 as an independent civil action
comparable to habeas corpus when it decided Morgan. See id. § 32.
161. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
162. Application of civil rules to § 2255 appeals under the § 2255 Rules still
appears to indicate that the civil rules could apply to coram nobis appeals.
163. RULEs GOvERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTs. 1 advi-
sory committee's note.
164. Id. Rule 11. Aside from Rule 11, the § 2255 Rules only govern district
court procedure. See i& Rules 1-10, 12.
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tween section 2255 and habeas corpus.'6 Coram nobis has no
comparable relationship with habeas corpus. 66
The unique relationship between section 2255 and habeas
corpus is evident in the legislative history of section 2255. The
advisory committee's note based its description of a section 2255
motion on the Senate report accompanying the proposed juris-
dictional bill. 6 7 Although the language of the jurisdictional bill
and the final version of section 2255 were generally compara-
ble,168 the two differed significantly respecting appeals. The ju-
risdictional bill stated that "[an appeal from an order granting
or denying the motion shall lie to the circuit court of ap-
peals."'1 69 Neither the bill nor the report indicated how a cir-
cuit court should handle such appeals. 70 In contrast, the final
version of section 2255 did. It read: "[a]n appeal may be taken
to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as
from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpu. 171
This reference to habeas corpus appeals in the final version
of section 2255, not the basic nature of a section 2255 motion,
apparently served as the basis for the Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the civil rules to section 2255 appeals. In Hayman, the
Court indicated in a footnote that the civil rules apply to sec-
tion 2255 appeals. 172 The footnote adopted the reasoning of
Mercado v. United States,173 in which the First Circuit ex-
amined whether the civil or criminal time limit for taking an
appeal applied to section 2255 appeals. 74 Although the govern-
165. Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1985); C. WRIGHT,
supra note 2, § 590; L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36.
166. Yasui, 772 F.2d at 1499.
167. RULEs GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIsT. CTs. 1 advi-
sory committee's note (quoting S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948));
see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
168. Compare supra note 73 (language of jurisdictional bill) with supra
note 54 (language of § 2255).
169. S. Res. 20, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1947).
170. See id at 3; S. REP. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) (emphasis added).
172. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952).
173. 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950). Mercado had pled guilty to transportation
of a revolver and to transportation of ammunition for the revolver. The dis-
trict court sentenced him to two consecutive two-year sentences for the convic-
tions. Id at 486. Mercado brought a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate his
sentence for the second conviction on the grounds that the two convictions
constituted one offense for the purpose of sentencing. Id The district court
denied relief and the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the offenses were
separate and distinct and that separate sentences were proper. Id at 486-87.
174. Id. at 486.
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ment contended that the criminal time limit applied because a
section 2255 proceeding was criminal in nature, 75 the First Cir-
cuit refused to resolve whether a section 2255 motion was a
civil or criminal proceeding.176 Instead, the court cited the lan-
guage of section 2255 and concluded that Congress clearly had
indicated that the rules applicable to appeals from habeas
corpus, the civil rules, apply to section 2255 appeals.177 Thus,
regardless of whether a section 2255 motion was criminal or
civil in nature, the law required application of the civil time
limit.1 8
The express language of section 2255 also explains why the
current Section 2255 Rules do not apply the criminal time limit
to section 2255 appeals. The history of the Section 2255 Rules
indicates that the criminal rules probably would apply to sec-
tion 2255 appeals absent the express language in section 2255 to
the contrary. When Congress enacted the Section 2255 Rules in
1976, the rules did not specify whether the civil or criminal
time limit for appeals applied to section 2255 appeals.179 The
advisory committee's note to Rule 1 describing a section 2255
motion as "a further step in the movant's criminal case" sug-
gested that the criminal time limit might apply. s0 To clarify
the situation, the Supreme Court amended Rule 11 to state ex-
pressly that the civil rule applied.' 8 ' The advisory committee's
175. Id.
176. Id. at 487. The First Circuit stated that "Iflor present purposes, how-
ever, we see no occasion to consider whether the instant proceeding is criminal
or civil in nature, or whether perhaps it is by nature a sort of hybrid." IH
177. Id The First Circuit reasoned that "if Congress had intended its
words to have the limited construction contended for we think it would, as it
easily could, have used appropriate language to express that limited meaning."
A.
178. Id. The First Circuit emphasized that Congress intended § 2255 to re-
place habeas corpus in most cases, and as such § 2255 should be interpreted
consistently with habeas corpus whenever possible. Id
179. The original form of Rule 11 did not explicitly address the length of
the time limit for appeals. Rule 11 originally read: "Nothing in these rules
shall be construed as extending the time to appeal from the original judgment
of conviction in the district court." Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings in the
U.S. Dist. Cts. 11, 425 U.S. 1167, 1187 (1976) (approved by Act of Sept. 28, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334, 1334-35 (1976)).
180. See RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PRocEEDINGs IN THE U.S. DIsT. CTS. 11
advisory committee's note. Shortly after the enactment of the § 2255 Rules in
1976, a general survey of federal post-conviction remedies assumed that the
criminal time limit applied to § 2255 appeals under the § 2255 Rules. See in-
fra note 205.
181. Order Amending Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 Proceedings,
441 U.S. 1001, 1003 (1979). The amended version of Rule 11 reads: "The time
for appeal from an order entered on a motion for relief made pursuant to
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note to amended Rule 11 indicates that the amendment follows
the Hayman Court's interpretation of section 2255, which was
based indirectly on the language of section 2255 itself. 8 2
Because the unique relationship between section 2255 and
habeas corpus does not exist between coram nobis and habeas
corpus, the Cooper court's description of section 2255 as "a fur-
ther step in the movant's criminal case" cannot serve as a
model for applying the civil rules to coram nobis appeals. The
civil rules apply to section 2255 appeals simply because the judi-
cial code specifically requires such rules to apply. 83 This re-
quirement reflects the purpose of section 2255 as a replacement
for habeas corpus. Unlike section 2255, coram nobis has no spe-
cial relationship to habeas corpus. It is not a replacement for
habeas corpus and has no statutory form expressly allowing ap-
these rules is as provided in Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Nothing in these rules shall be construed as extending the time to ap-
peal from the original judgment of conviction in the district court." I& The
amendment became effective August 1, 1979. IM at 1004.
182. RuLEs GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS iN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 11 advi-
sory committee's note. The advisory committee's note reads:
Prior to the promulgation of the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings, the courts consistently held that the time for appeal in a
section 2255 case is as provided in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), that is, 60 days
when the government is a party, rather than as provided in appellate
rule 4(b), which says that the time is 10 days in criminal cases. This
result has often been explained on the ground that rule 4(a) has to do
with civil cases and that "proceedings under section 2255 are civil in
nature." E.g., Rothman v. United States, 508 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1975).
Because the new section 2255 rules are based upon the premise "that
a motion under § 2255 is a further step in the movant's criminal case
rather than a separate civil action," see Advisory Committee Note to
rule 1, the question has arisen whether the new rules have the effect
of shortening the time for appeal to that provided in appellate rule
4(b). A sentence has been added to rule 11 in order to make it clear
that this is not the case.
Even though § 2255 proceedings are a further step in the criminal
case, the added sentence correctly states current law. In United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), the Supreme Court noted that
such appeals "are governed by the civil rules applicable to appeals
from final judgments in habeas corpus actions." In support, the Court
cited Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950), a case re-
jecting the argument that because § 2255 proceedings are criminal in
nature the time for appeals is only 10 days. The Mercado court con-
cluded that the situation was governed by that part of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
which reads: "An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from
the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus." Thus, because appellate rule 4(a) is
applicable in habeas cases, it likewise governs in § 2255 cases even
though they are criminal in nature.
Id.
183. See Order Amending Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254,2255 Proceed-
ings, 441 U.S. 1001, 1003 (1979).
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peals as in habeas corpus.'14 Absent such a relationship, the
Morgan Court's description of a coram nobis motion as "a step
in the criminal case," indicates that the criminal rules should
apply to coram nobis motions.las
3. The Cooper Court's Interpretation of Coram Nobis Fails to
Solve the Morgan Footnote Paradox
The Cooper court's attempt to reconcile both parts of the
Morgan footnote under an interpretation of a coram nobis pro-
ceeding as civil in nature fails. The Morgan Court did not con-
sider section 2255 a step in the criminal case, and even if such a
characterization were accurate, the reasons for applying the
civil rules to section 2255 appeals despite its description as a
step in the criminal case do not apply to coram nobis. Conse-
quently, the first part of the Morgan footnote still indicates
that a coram nobis motion is criminal in nature, while the sec-
ond part of the footnote indicates that a coram nobis motion is
civil.
B. AN INTERPRETATION OF CoRA NOBIS AS A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING
The Cooper court's failure to reconcile the paradoxical lan-
guage of the Morgan footnote under an interpretation of a
coram nobis motion as civil in nature, does not, by itself,
demonstrate that the footnote's language is reconcilable under
an interpretation of a coram nobis motion as criminal in na-
ture.186 Reconciliation is possible only if the second part of the
Morgan footnote, comparing a coram nobis motion to a section
2255 motion, does not necessarily indicate that a coram nobis
motion is a civil proceeding. The second part of the Morgan
footnote then would be compatible with the first part, describ-
ing coram nobis as "a step in the criminal case."1 8 7
184. Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth
Circuit held that § 2255 "establishes a special, statutory remedy with its own
particular procedural requirements and limitations, and explicitly authorizes
the taking of appeals as in habeas corpus cases. No such structure surrounds
the coram nobis writ." I&
185. 1&
186. The Morgan footnote's language simply may be contradictory.
187. Whether the second part of the Morgan footnote implies that a coram
nobis motion is a criminal proceeding or simply implies nothing about the mo-
tion's nature, the second part of the footnote would be compatible with the
first part, which implies that coram nobis is a criminal proceeding. In either
situation, together, the two parts would indicate that a coram nobis motion is
criminal.
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1. An Interpretation of the Language of the Second Part of
the Morgan Footnote
The second part of the Morgan footnote, comparing a
coram nobis motion to a section 2255 motion, merely reflects
that a coram nobis motion, like a section 2255 motion,
originates in the sentencing district as opposed to the district of
confinement.'88  Although this analysis resembles the Cooper
court's interpretation of the first part of the Morgan foot-
note, 8 9 the analysis is more applicable to the second part of the
footnote. The first part of the Morgan footnote explicitly de-
scribes habeas corpus as an independent civil action, but the
second part does not discuss the basic nature of a section 2255
motion. 90 As such, the language of the second part simply may
reflect the jurisdictional similarity between the two motions.191
The legislative history of section 2255 supports the conclu-
sion that section 2255 is similar to coram nobis only to the ex-
tent that both originate in the sentencing district. Section 2255
is a substitute for habeas corpus in the sentencing district
whether or not it is interchangeable with habeas corpus.192
Although the reviser's note to section 2255 stated that section
2255 "restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the na-
ture of the ancient writ of error coram nobis,' 193 the Statement
of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Proce-
dure described the remedy contained in the jurisdictional bill,
the prototype of section 2255, as "in the nature of, but much
broader than, coram nobis." The Statement concluded that
188. This is, of course, a very limited reading of the language of the second
part of the Morgan footnote. Yet other commentators have argued that the
similarity between coram nobis and § 2255 ends with the common district of
origin. Note, supra note 3, at 791 n.24; Donnelly, supra note 39, at 27 n.33.
189. The Cooper court held that the distinction between coram nobis and
habeas corpus contained in the first part of the Morgan footnote only reflects
the different districts in which the two actions originate. United States v.
Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
190. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954).
191. This reading also reflects a § 2255 motion's unique relationship to a pe-
tition for habeas corpus, a relationship that a coram nobis motion does not
have with a petition for habeas corpus. A § 2255 motion is like a coram nobis
motion in that it originates in the sentencing district. Yet in all other respects,
a § 2255 motion is comparable to a petition for habeas corpus. See generally
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) (holding that § 2255 is the
substantive equivalent of habeas corpus in the sentencing district instead of
the district of confinement).
192. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 210-19.
193. H.R. REP. NO. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947), reviser's note
(Q 2255), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEws 1692, 1908.
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"[a]s a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as habeas
corpus."'' 1 Thus section 2255 was in the nature of coram nobis
only to the extent that, like coram nobis, it is brought in the
sentencing district.
The judicial interpretation of section 2255 also supports
this narrow reading of the second part of the Morgan footnote.
Aside from the district of origination, the Supreme Court con-
sistently has interpreted a section 2255 motion as the equivalent
of habeas corpus, not a coram nobis motion.195 The Supreme
Court's analysis of the reviser's note's description of section
2255 in Hayman supports this conclusion as well.1' The
Hayman Court concluded that the reviser's note to section 2255
did not indicate that Congress had adopted coram nobis proce-
dure as it existed at common law.197 Instead, the reviser's note
merely indicated "that the Section 2255 motion was 'in the na-
ture of' the coram nobis writ in the sense that a Section 2255
proceeding, like coram nobis, is an independent action brought
in the court that entered judgment."'19 The language of the
Hayman footnote indicates that when the Court decided Mor-
gan, it considered a coram nobis motion similar to a section
2255 motion in a limited fashion only - both motions
originated in the same district.1'
194. Judicial Conference Statement, supra note 68, quoted in Hayman, 342
U.S. at 216-17. For pertinent text of the Statement, see supra note 68.
195. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1962).
196. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 221 n.36.
197. Id. For pertinent text of the footnote, see supra note 81.
198. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 221 n.36. The Hayman footnote may appear to
preclude a limited reading of the second part of the Morgan footnote and actu-
ally indicate that a coram nobis motion is civil in nature. In the footnote, the
Court specifically refers to coram nobis as "an independent action." Id. The
Hayman Court's use of similar language, "an independent and collateral in-
quiry," to describe § 2255 indicates that the Court considered § 2255 an in-
dependent civil action. Id. at 222. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying
text. Consequently, the Hayman footnote appears to indicate that the compar-
ison between coram nobis and § 2255 in the second part of the Morgan foot-
note extends to the characterization of the two actions as civil.
The Hayman footnote, however, refers to the common law form of coram
nobis, which was civil in nature, not the modern federal form. Id. at 221 n.36.
Thus, the language of the Hayman footnote does not preclude the conclusion
that the modern federal form of coram nobis is criminal in nature.
199. Consequently, this reading of the Morgan footnote, unlike the Cooper
court's reading, is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation prior to
Morgan of a § 2255 motion as a civil proceeding. See supra notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.
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2. Change in Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings
Furthermore, contrary to the Cooper court's analysis, the
current Section 2255 Rules also support the conclusion that
coram nobis is criminal in nature.2°0 The Section 2255 Rules
described a section 2255 motion as "a further step in the mo-
vant's criminal case"20 1 and in opposition to longstanding judi-
cial practice,20 2 applied the criminal rules in part to section 2255
proceedings at the district level.203 This description of a section
2255 motion raised the question whether the time limit for
criminal appeals applied to section 2255 appeals.2°4 One general
survey of federal post-conviction remedies published shortly af-
ter the enactment of the original Section 2255 Rules stated that
the criminal time limit did apply to section 2255 appeals.205 The
Supreme Court finally resolved the issue, based on Hayman, by
amending the Section 2255 Rules to specify that the civil time
limit applied to section 2255 appeals.206
The change in rules governing section 2255 motions dis-
plays a natural relationship between the concept of a motion as
a step in the criminal case and the application of the criminal
rules.2°7 As such, it reinforces the conclusion that application
of the civil rules to section 2255 appeals reflects the unique po-
200. The Cooper court argued that advisory committee's note to Rule 1 of
the § 2255 Rules describing a § 2255 motion as "a further step in the movant's
criminal case," supported the conclusion that a coram nobis motion, like a
§ 2255 motion, is a civil proceeding. United States v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192,
1194 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The Seventh Circuit also relied on a similar
analysis. The court argued that application of both civil and criminal rules to
§ 2255 under the modern rule strengthens the comparison of comm nobis to
§ 2255 and the conclusion that coram nobis is a hybrid remedy. United States
v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 917
(1980).
201. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 1 advi-
sory committee's note.
202. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 590 at 420-22.
203. RULEs GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DisT. CTS. 3-4, 6,
11-12. The specific language of § 2255 precludes the application of the criminal
rules at the appellate stage. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
204. RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 1 advi-
sory committee's note.
205. Mills & Herrmann, supra note 40, at 80. The survey asserted that be-
cause "a section 2255 proceeding is part of the original criminal proceeding, the
time for appeal is governed by Federal Rule 4(b) of Appellate Procedure. An
appeal must be filed within ten days after entry of the judgment or order ap-
pealed from." I&
206. See supra notes 179-82.
207. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
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sition of section 2255 as a substitute for habeas corpus.208 Be-
cause coram nobis does not share this relationship to habeas
corpus, the basic nature of coram nobis as a step in the criminal
case indicates that the criminal rules should govern coram
nobis appeals.
3. The Proposed Interpretation of Coram Nobis Solves the
Morgan Footnote Paradox
The proposed attempt to reconcile the first and second
parts of the Morgan footnote succeeds. To the extent that the
second part of the Morgan footnote merely reflects that a
coram nobis motion, like a section 2255 motion, originates in
the sentencing district as opposed to the district of confine-
ment, it does not indicate whether a coram nobis motion is civil
or criminal in nature. Under the proposed interpretation,
therefore, the second part of the Morgan footnote does not con-
flict with the first part, and together the two parts indicate that
a coram nobis motion is a criminal proceeding.
C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This Comment has concentrated on the language of the
Morgan footnote, as opposed to policy considerations, to deter-
mine whether coram nobis is a civil or criminal proceeding, be-
cause the courts of appeals have done so.20 9 Although one
circuit court opinion included a policy argument, the decision
did not turn on a policy analysis.21 0 Instead, the court men-
tioned policy largely in passing as support for the outcome of its
interpretation of the Morgan footnote's language.211 To a cer-
tain extent, however, the policy considerations involved may be
more important and compelling in resolving the question than
the footnote's language. 21 2 The policy considerations underly-
208. See supra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 100-34 and accompanying text.
210. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968) (observing that
the "policy considerations supporting prescription of a very short time for ap-
peal in a criminal case are notably absent in coram nobis").
211. ML
212. Although the courts and this Comment have focused on whether
coram nobis is a civil or criminal proceeding based on the Morgan footnote, a
more fundamental question is whether coram nobis ought to be a civil or crim-
inal proceeding. Strictly speaking, the Morgan footnote is controlling on lower
courts. To the degree that the footnote's language clearly supports a particular
interpretation of coram nobis, policy considerations are irrelevant to a lower
court's analysis. Yet imposing an interpretation of coram nobis based on the
Morgan footnote that conflicts with relevant policy considerations would ap-
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ing the administration of post-conviction remedies support an
interpretation of a coram nobis motion as a criminal proceeding
and the application of the criminal rules to coram nobis
appeals. 213
The current American Bar Association Standards for Crim-
inal Justice (ABA Standards)214 address the relevant policy
considerations. The ABA Standards stress that the function,
not the label "civil" or "criminal," of a post-conviction remedy
should determine the applicable procedure.215 In light of their
obvious function, the ABA Standards state that the courts
should view post-conviction remedies as an extension of the
original criminal case and, to that extent, treat such remedies
as part of the criminal process.216 Referring directly to a sec-
tion 2255 motion, the ABA Standards explain that "it is anoma-
lous to have an extension of a criminal proceeding
characterized as purely civil. '217 The ABA Standards indicate
that the procedure for processing appeals from post-conviction
appeals and direct appeals from criminal judgments ought to be
the same.2 18 In particular, the ABA Standards state that the
pear unjust. The court would be applying the letter of the law, while under-
mining the purpose of the law.
213. See STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10.
214. The ABA Standards serve as a general model for both state and fed-
eral criminal justice systems.
215. STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10.
216. I. Standard 22-1.2 reads:
The procedural characteristics of the post-conviction remedy
should be appropriate to the purposes of the remedy. While the post-
conviction proceeding is separate from the original prosecution pro-
ceeding, the post-conviction stage is an extension of the original pro-
ceeding and should be related to it insofar as feasible.
Id- Standard 22-1.2.
The ABA Standards do not suggest that all the rules applicable to crimi-
nal prosecutions should also apply to post-conviction proceedings. Certain
rules protecting constitutional rights in criminal prosecutions do not necessar-
ily apply to post-conviction proceedings even though post-conviction proceed-
ings are extensions of the criminal prosecution. The commentary to Standard
22-1.2 states:
Removing the "civil" characterization from post-conviction proce-
dure and relating that remedy more to the criminal process should
not produce constitutional questions. Recognition of the criminal na-
ture of litigation does not warrant attachment to a post-conviction
proceeding of the constitutional limitations applicable to the prosecu-
tion phrase. Whether the applicant must be present at a prehearing
conference, for example, is not determined by the unquestioned right
of a defendant to be present at all stages of the prosecution.
Id, Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10.
217. I&
218. See id- Standard 22-5.3 commentary at 22.61 & n.1 (advocating flexible
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rules of procedure applicable to initiating direct criminal ap-
peals, including the time limit for filing notice of appeal, also
should apply to post-conviction remedies.219 This follows from
the concept of a post-conviction remedy as an extension of the
original criminal case.220
This policy strongly supports the application of the crimi-
nal time limit to coram nobis appeals in federal courts.221
Although application of the mixture of civil and criminal rules
governing section 2255 motions at the district court level would
not undermine this policy, the application of the civil rules gov-
erning section 2255 motions at the appellate level would. Ap-
plication of the section 2255 rules to coram nobis motions in the
procedures for appeals concerning post-conviction remedies and cross-refer-
encing to procedures recommended for direct criminal appeals).
219. AL Standards 22-5.1 to 22-5.2 commentary at 22.57-.59. The commen-
tary to Standard 22-5.1 states that the longer time limit for civil appeals is "not
necessarily appropriate to post-conviction cases" and concludes that "[i]n keep-
ing with the principle that the post-conviction proceeding is an extension of
the criminal prosecution phase, it is better to use the same procedure for ap-
pellate review whether on direct appeal from conviction or at a post-conviction
stage." I Standard 22-5.1 commentary at 22.58.
220. I&
221. In contrast to the ABA Standards, the Second Circuit argued that the
policy considerations supporting the short time for criminal appeals under the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to coram nobis appeals.
United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second Circuit
did not discuss these considerations, but presumably the court reached this
conclusion because a corum nobis petitioner already has served her sentence.
See id. Although the commentary to the ABA Standards acknowledges that
the 10-day criminal time limit under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
is "exceptionally short" and that a longer period is needed, the commentary to
Standards 22-5.1 and 22-5.2 still indicate that the 60-day civil time limit is inap-
propriate. STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standards 22-5.1 to 22-5.2 commentary at
22.57-.59. The commentary emphasizes that the criminal rules are preferable
to the civil rules, because a post-conviction proceeding is an extension of the
original criminal proceeding. I&.
The policy favoring application of the same procedural rules to post-con-
viction appeals as to criminal appeals outweighs the Second Circuit's policy
concerns. The potential need in post-conviction cases for a time limit longer
than the standard 10-day limit for criminal appeals does not require applica-
tion of the 60-day limit for civil appeals. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) allows a district
court to grant up to a 30-day extension of the time limit for a criminal appeal,
effectively providing up to a 40-day limit. This provision is not meaningless in
practice. The Ninth Circuit has permitted a coram nobis petitioner to apply
for such an extension, Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir.
1983), and the Eighth Circuit has implied that it is available, United States v.
Mills, 430 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1970). Thus the federal courts should apply
Rule 4(b) to coram nobis appeals to conform to the view that a coram nobis
motion is part of the original criminal prosecution, and should not impose an
unreasonably short time limit for such appeals.
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district court would not undermine the concept of a coram
nobis motion as an extension of the criminal prosecution, be-
cause such a concept does not require the blanket application of
the criminal rules.222 In contrast, the application of the civil
rules to coram nobis appeals would undermine this concept by
drawing a sharp distinction between appellate review on direct
appeal from a conviction and on appeal from a post-conviction
stage.22- Thus the application of the civil time limit to coram
nobis appeals undermines the policy of treating post-conviction
remedies as an extension of the original criminal prosecution.
A different policy consideration, however, uniformity of
process among post-conviction remedies, might favor applica-
tion of the civil rules to cormm nobis appeals. In many respects,
such as grounds for relief and rules of procedure in the district
court, the federal courts treat a comm nobis and a section 2255
motion in essentially the same manner.224 This suggests that
courts should treat coram nobis and section 2255 appeals in the
same manner as well, for the sake of uniformity.5 Although
the ABA Standards provide that the criminal rules ought to ap-
ply to post-conviction remedies in theory, arguably the civil
rules should apply in practice.
This analysis places form over substance. Application of
the proper rules to a particular post-conviction remedy when
possible is more important than uniformity among post-convic-
tion remedies. 226 Although the ABA Standards affirm that uni-
formity in post-conviction remedies is a desirable goal,2  the
ABA Standards emphasize that blanket application of civil
222. See STANDARDS, supr note 8, Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10.
223. See i&. Standard 22-5.2 commentary at 22.58. Coram nobis would be-
come an independent civil action, divorced from the original criminal
prosecution.
224. See L. YACKLE, supra note 7, § 36, at 167, § 38, at 173; C. WRIGHT,
supra note 2, § 592, at 433.
225. Such uniformity would simplify the system of post-conviction reme-
dies for federal convictions. Section 2255 and coram nobis effectively would
become the same remedy. The only difference would be the custody require-
ment. Section 2255 would apply when the petitioner is in custody and coram
nobis would apply when the petitioner is not in custody.
226. Although applying the civil rules to corm nobis appeals would sim-
plify the federal scheme of post-conviction remedies, this simplification is
largely uniformity for uniformity's sake. The ABA Standards demonstrate
that the criminal rules should apply to appeals in post-conviction cases, be-
cause such proceedings are an extension of the original criminal case. See
STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 22-5.2 commentary at 22.58.
227. Id- Standard 22-1.1. Standard 22-1.1 recommends a single, comprehen-
sive post-conviction remedy. Id.
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rules to post-conviction appeals is improper. As an extension
of the criminal case, the courts generally should apply the same
procedural rules to post-conviction appeals as to direct criminal
appeals.2 The language of section 2255, however, requires
courts to apply the civil rules to section 2255 appeals. ° Coram
nobis, without any statutory basis, has no such restraint. The
statutorily imposed application of the civil rules to section 2255
motions does not justify applying the civil rules to comm nobis
appeals when such an application is not required and would be
otherwise improper2 31 Limited application of appropriate rules
is preferable to universal application of inappropriate ones.
Furthermore, even if uniformity is the paramount goal, it
does not necessarily imply that courts should apply the civil
rules to coram nobis appeals. Because the propriety of applying
the civil rules to section 2255 motions is questionable,2 2 the
goal of uniformity reasonably suggests amending section 2255 to
allow the application of the criminal rules to section 2255 ap-
peals rather than applying the civil rules to comm nobis ap-
peals.2 33 Thus uniformity, as well as the concept of a post-
conviction remedy as an extension of the original criminal pros-
ecution, effectively supports application of the criminal rules to
comm nobis appeals.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Morgan, the Supreme Court revived the
common law writ of error coram nobis, but the Court's para-
doxical footnote demonstrated that the modem federal form
differed from the traditional common law form. This footnote
has left the circuit courts split over the fundamental nature of
the writ, and in turn, the proper rules to apply to it. Although
228. i Standard 22-1.2 commentary at 22.10.
229. Id Standards 22.-5.1 to 22-5.2 commentary at 22.57-.59.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 165-82.
231. The civil rules apply to § 2255 appeals simply because of the specific
language of § 2255. The advisory committee's note to Rule 11 of the § 2255
Rules indicates that absent this language, the criminal rules potentially would
apply to § 2255 appeals. See RULES GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE
U.S. DIST. CTS. 11 advisory committee's note. No comparable reason exists to
apply the civil rules to coram nobis motions. See supra notes 179-85 and ac-
companying text.
232. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
233. Such an amendment to § 2255, however, may revive the question
whether § 2255 is an unconstitutional denial of habeas corpus. See generally
supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing original constitutional
challenge to § 2255 in Hayman).
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the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Cooper represents the most com-
prehensive attempt at interpreting the Morgan footnote, the
Cooper court's interpretation fails to solve the Morgan footnote
paradox. The apparently contradictory language of the Morgan
footnote is inherently irreconcilable under an interpretation of
a coram nobis motion as a civil action. Only an interpretation
of coram nobis as criminal in nature permits a coherent reading
of the footnote. Furthermore, such an interpretation is consis-
tent with the policy considerations underlying the administra-
tion of post-conviction remedies. The basic criminal nature of a
coram nobis motion indicates that the mixture of civil and
criminal rules governing section 2255 motions in the district
courts may serve as a guide for coram nobis proceedings, but
that the civil rules governing section 2255 appeals may not. In-
stead, the basic nature of coram nobs requires application of
the rules governing criminal appeals.
Brendan W. Randall
